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Preface
Emission scenarios are an important topic for IPCC, because they have been used in the Second and Third
Assessment Report to project future climate change and climate change impacts and they form a basis for
evaluating response options. In the past IPCC published long-term emission scenarios, the so-called IS92
and SRES sets in 1992 and 2000 respectively. For the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) it was decided by
the 21st IPCC plenary session (November 2003) that no new emission scenarios would be prepared but
that new literature on emission scenarios, including criticism on the SRES scenarios, should be assessed in
the Working Group III contribution to the AR4. The IPCC Plenary called for an Expert Meeting on
Emission Scenarios to assist in that process.
This Expert Meeting on Emission Scenarios was held in Washington from January 12 – 14, 2005 and
kindly hosted by the US Government. We would like to thank the US Government for their financial
support and for all the efforts by the local organisers to make this meeting a success. We thank the
Programme Committee for their valuable inputs in preparing the meeting and the session chairs and
participants for making the meeting a success.
This report consists of a summary of the meeting sessions, the presentations and the discussions.
Furthermore, the speakers have been requested to submit extended abstracts that can be found in Annex II.
The material has undergone the following review process: the draft summary report was sent to all speakers
and participants and comments were incorporated in the final version. Some of the papers are being
revised, based on the discussions at the meeting, for publication in a special issue of Energy Economics.
We hope that the material will be used as a valuable input to the AR4, in particular to the chapter on long-
term mitigation issues in the Working group III contribution. While this activity was held pursuant to a
decision of the IPCC, such decision does not imply the Working Group or Panel endorsement or approval
of the proceedings or any recommendations or conclusions therein. In particular, it should be noted that the
views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not those of IPCC Working Group III or other
sponsors.
Ogunlade Davidson
Bert Metz
Co-Chairs, IPCC Working Group III
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and goals 
In 2001 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a set of scenarios in the Special
Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES). These scenarios have been developed in a four year process with
many scientists involved in the writing and the review process. The SRES scenarios have played an
important role in the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC and will be used in the upcoming Fourth
Assessment Report (AR4) as the 21st IPCC plenary session (November 2003) decided that no new baseline
scenario would be prepared for the AR4, in view of the time it takes before new scenarios are taken up by
the research community and used in publications. At the same time the plenary session called for an Expert
Meeting on the issue of the use of scenarios in AR4 under the auspices of Working Group III. This expert
meeting took place 12 – 14 January 2005 in Washington DC, kindly hosted by the US government.
In the Working Group III contribution of the AR4, Chapter 3: Issues related to mitigation in the long-term
context, deals with long-term emission scenarios. It was therefore decided that the meeting should address
new insights in the literature since the Third Assessment Report (TAR) on the issues to be included in
Chapter 3.
The outline of this chapter contains the following issues: 
• Baseline emission scenarios: assessment of new literature since SRES. The assessment should cover
literature on emission scenarios that include climate feedbacks.
• Mitigation and stabilization scenarios and strategies, and costs and socio-economic implications (with
appropriate uncertainties) including multiple gases.
• Development pathways, trends and goals.
• Role of technologies in long-term mitigation and stabilization: research, development, deployment,
diffusion and transfer.
• Interaction of mitigation and adaptation, in the light of climate change impacts and decision making
under long-term uncertainties. Not only present costs of mitigation but also avoided climate change
damages and costs of adaptation should be included.
• Linkages between short and medium term mitigation and long-term stabilization, including the
implications of inertia, risk and uncertainty for decision making.
In addition, it was decided to address the following issues:
• Criticism on the SRES scenarios and implications for their use for AR4 (including macro-economic
projections for developing countries and PPP vs. MER based macro-economic scenarios);
• Possibilities to use simple climate models to evaluate the climate implications of stabilization and
mitigation scenarios;
• Possibilities to get insight in the impact of climate change for these mitigation and stabilization
scenarios and analysis of adaptation options for these scenarios;
• How to deal with multi-gas scenarios; metrics for equivalence across greenhouse gases and other
radiative forcing agents; associated emission profiles; mitigation cost estimates;
• The advantages and disadvantages of the use of probabilistic approaches. 
The meeting aimed furthermore at increasing the interaction between Lead Authors of Chapter 3 with non-
Lead Authors and Lead Authors from other chapters of Working Groups I, II and III. 
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1.2 Organisation
The meeting was organised with extensive assistance of a program committee, chaired by Bert Metz, co-
chair of IPCC Working Group III. The program committee decided on the program, the speakers and the
participants. The members of the program committee were:
Bert Metz (Chair) Co-Chair WGIII
Rajendra Pachauri Chair IPCC
Anthony Adegbulugbe CLA Chapter 4
Francisco de la Chesnaye Host meeting 1, LA Chapter 3
Brian Fisher CLA Chapter 3
Henry Jacoby MIT
Mikiko Kainuma LA Chapter 3
Jiang Kejun LA Chapter 3
Tom Kram TG ICA
Emilio La Rovere LA Chapter 3
Nebojsa Nakicenovic Host meeting 2, CLA Chapter 3
Joaquim Oliveira Martins OECD
Sarah Raper Representative contact WG I
Ferenc Toth Representative contact WG II
Secretary of the Program Committee was Monique Hoogwijk of the TSU of Working Group III.
1.3 Program and participants
A program was put together that addressed all topics listed in Section 1.1. Experts were approached to
prepare presentations. To ensure adequate exchange of views, half of the time was scheduled for
discussions. The entire program is attached in Annex I. 
The meeting was by invitation only and about 80 experts were selected in consultation with the Program
Committee, based on a balance of expertise, geographical background and IPCC versus non-IPCC
involvement. Invited were:
• All Lead Authors from Chapter 3 of the WGIII contribution to the AR4. 
• Representatives from the other chapters of the WGIII contribution to the AR4. The chapters were asked
for nominations.
• Experts on emission/stabilization scenarios.
• Heads of the TSUs, Lead Authors from WGI, WGII and members of the IPCC Task Group on Data and
Scenario Support for Impact and Climate Analysis (TGICA).
• Non-climate researchers with expertise on economic growth, technological development or, land-use.
There were in total 71 participants, of which 13 work in a developing country, 33 are Lead Authors from
Working Group III and 8 from other Working Groups and the TGICA. 
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2. Summary of the presentations and discussions
2.1 Opening session
The meeting was officially opened on behalf of the US government by Mr Jeffrey Holmstead, Assistant
Administrator for Air & Radiation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. He heads EPA’s Office
of Air and Radiation which is in charge of programs addressing global climate change, industrial and
vehicle pollution, acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, radiation protection and indoor air quality. Mr
Holmstead mentioned that President Bush personally recognizes the role of IPCC. He explained that
reducing uncertainties related to climate change is one of the key objectives of US policy. He addressed
several programs that have been introduced in the US on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. He
explained that emission scenarios are considered important for the US government to understand the
relationship of the greenhouse house gas intensity and economic growth, population and technological
development.
Bert Metz, co-chair of IPCC Working Group III welcomed the participants on behalf of IPCC and gave a
brief introduction on the background and the goals of the meeting. He introduced the planning for the
Fourth Assessment Report and the cross cutting issues that have been defined. 
2.2 Session 1: Emissions scenarios. 
Chair: Bert Metz
Speakers: Brian Fisher, ABARE and Nebojsa Nakicenovic, IIASA/Vienna University of technology,
Emission scenarios: Introduction.
Nebojsa Nakicenovic, IIASA/Vienna University of Technology and Coordinating Lead Author of Chapter
3, Working Group III, introduced the past emission scenarios developed in the context of IPCC, the SRES
scenarios and its criticism. He presented the range of scenarios that have been published after the SRES
(Post-SRES scenarios). These scenarios have been collected by the National Institute for Environmental
Studies (Japan) (Mikiko Kainuma). From the comparison of the Post-SRES scenarios with the ranges of
the SRES scenarios it could be concluded that:
1. Recent (Post-SRES) population scenarios assume significantly lower fertility rates in the world that
result in lower population growth that is reflected in a downward shift of the whole range;
2. The range of Gross World Product from recent non-intervention scenarios over this century is extended
upwards. However, the median does not change significantly;
3. The range of carbon emissions from recent non-intervention scenarios is slightly higher on the upper
limit than the SRES range (more than 20GtC). The SRES scenarios have been criticized for
overestimating future emissions; however, the Post-SRES literature shows a higher emission range.
Independent population projections from the UN and IIASA that have not been integrated with the
emission scenarios are lower. But again, the median of all emission scenarios has not changed
significantly compared to SRES.
4. The concept of “non-intervention” reference scenarios is increasingly becoming elusive and
hypothetical as climate policies are becoming a reality in many parts of the world. Much of the Post-
SRES literature still includes reference, non-intervention scenarios however.
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Brian Fisher, ABARE and co-Coordinating Lead Author of Chapter 3, continued the presentation by
addressing one item of uncertainty that will also be addressed in Chapter 3: the differences in (base year)
starting points for scenarios based on historical data. He showed several examples of statistical data that
has been updated as a result of new information and statistical data that varies by source. Examples of
revised or inconsistent data included statistics on historical coal production in China, electricity generated
from coal and gas in India, gas production in Japan and population statistics in China. These historical data,
which provide the starting point for scenarios, are therefore associated with an element of uncertainty that
should not be neglected. He also pointed out that forecasting errors with respect to generation of scenarios
over long time horizons are likely to increase with the length of projection and are likely to be larger than
predicted due to the effects of forecast ‘anchoring’.
Discussion
Several questions were addressed on the type of literature that will be assessed in Chapter 3 of the AR4. It
was explained that no new IPCC scenarios will be developed for the AR4, but literature review of all types
of scenarios will be included, covering, if literature is available: back casting scenarios, more regional
aggregation, and the linkages between long term and short term scenarios. Scenario literature from IEA,
EEA and OECD will be evaluated, as well as peer-reviewed scientific journal publications. The LAs of
SRES did not provide a recommendation on what SRES storyline is most likely. Chapter 3 in the AR4 will
however assess literature on probabilistic scenarios. A specific suggestion was made to include statistics of
probabilistic ensembles, such as the median and the percentiles in the comparison of deterministic and the
probabilistic scenarios in Chapter 3. The difficulty of reference case definition and comparability in SRES
and post-SRES scenarios was also raised. 
2.3 Session 2: Keynote speaker
Speaker: Bill Nordhaus, Yale University, Should Modellers Use Purchasing Power Parity or Market
Exchange Rates in Global Modeling Systems?
Bill Nordhaus addressed in his presentation what would be the most appropriate unit to use for the
conversion of local currencies to comparable values when modelling economic growth and related energy
use and emissions scenarios on a global scale: Purchasing Power Parities or Market Exchange Rates? He
postulated a matrix with a PPP versus MER dimension and a domestic versus international prices for all
goods and services dimension. He proposed to use what he calls the "Superlative PPP accounts" (originally
called a "hybrid account"). This approach uses PPP exchange rates and combines these with actual market
prices for each country. These are called "superlative PPP accounts" because they rely upon superlative
indexes over both space and time to compare outputs of different countries. Under ideal circumstances, this
approach will provide accurate and consistent cross sections and time series. Nordhaus recommended that
modellers need to consider whether behavioural and reduced-form relationships in their models have been
correctly estimated when moving to PPP cross-sectional valuations. He addressed that whether the PPP
method is feasible depends also on the type of PPP approach considered. The superlative PPP accounts are
very close to existing approaches and require relatively few technological conversion issues. It is important
to note is that there is no one-to-one mapping from MER data to PPP data in global models. This fact makes
converting from MER to PPP difficult, given present data and model parameters. However, a simple, linear
conversion is unlikely to hold in practice because of non-linearities in the aggregation of country data and
in the economic and technological behavioural relationships within and between countries. Recent studies
with PPP indicated that emissions could be 17 – 40% lower when using PPP compared to MER. However,
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Nordhaus added that he was not certain whether these studies have recalibrated their models correctly.
Therefore, to study the impact of using MER instead of PPP in emission scenarios, new models are needed
that have properly recalibrated all behavioural and reduced-form relationships. Furthermore, data on PPP
are about two orders less abundant than MER data; this also needs attention.
Discussion
In the discussion after the presentation, several questions were raised on aspects of the proposed method,
for example, the importance of the starting year chosen to derive the PPP rates. This is important and does
have an influence, but if data are constructed correctly with superlative indexes there should not be a cross
sectional bias going backwards or forwards with data. Whether the method is also applicable when using
a regional model that aggregates country data, Nordhaus stated that this is possible as you can aggregate
national economies using PPP weights for the base year and then use national growth rates to run the model
forward for national outputs. There was furthermore some discussion about how to handle goods that are
traded at (international) markets at MER prices. Finally, it was stated that more work is also needed on the
long-term relationship between MER and PPP. This relationship changes over time; for example it is
certainly different now than 100 years ago.
2.4 Session 3: Development pathways, trends and goals in relation to scenarios.
What is the role of socio-economic driving forces in scenario development?
Chair: Emilio La Rovere, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
Speakers: Brian O’Neill, IIASA, Role of demographics in emission scenario 
Joaquim Oliveira Martins, OECD, Long-term Economic Growth Projections: could they be
made less arbitrary?
Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University, Scenarios and Development pathways 
Brian O’Neill, IIASA, presented the relationship between population size, other demographic factors and
emission scenarios. He started by presenting the changes in demographic outlook since SRES. The changes
since SRES are similar as presented by Nakicenovic in the previous presentation; there is a general
downward shift in projected population size. The global results seem to be mainly driven by developing
regions. Compared to these new projections, the A2 scenarios seem to be implausibly high, and the low
end of the current range is not well represented in SRES. Regarding the age structure, new projections
foresee the possibility of significantly more aging than before, and SRES scenarios cover about the median,
but do not cover well the high end of the aging range of these post-SRES studies, particularly in
industrialized countries. O’Neill stated that the inclusion of demographics in emission models should not
be limited to population size, because age structure, household size and rate of urbanization may differ and
have implications. However new work is required on this. He showed some preliminary results for China
and the US on urbanization, household structure and income and some preliminary modelling results with
the PET model (Population – Environment- Technology model). This general equilibrium model has 4
world regions. This new work showed that inclusion of these demographic factors could substantially
affect energy and emission scenarios. 
Joaquim Oliveira Martins, OECD, presented a joint paper with Giuseppe Nicoletti focusing on the main
drivers of economic growth, in the context of long-term projections. GDP per capita growth can be
decomposed into labour utilization, which is a function of the hours worked per worker and the
employment rate, and labour productivity, which is a function of the capital per hour worked and the multi-
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factor productivity. For the projection of labour utilization a cohort approach is required, that looks at how
labour participation of population cohorts changes over time. On average, though, over the long run,
cohorts are assumed to have a similar participation rate. For the projection of long-term labour
productivity, it is important to identify the productivity leaders and the convergence process of the
followers. Identifying the leaders is not easy because technological shifts are not easily predicted.
Regarding convergence, the features and determinants for catch up are often not known. Nevertheless,
Oliveira Martins distinguished three scenarios: 1. all countries converge to the same labour productivity
level; 2. all countries converge to the same labour productivity growth but stay at different levels; 3. no
convergence, neither in growth rates or levels. Without policies, scenario 2 seems the most likely one. In
this regard, it is important to understand growth accelerations that take place in developing regions. The
main driver of long-run labour productivity growth is the prediction of multi-factor productivity. The latter
depends on four factors: 1. Shifts in sector composition, 2. Changes in labour quality (there are conflicting
forces at work in OECD); 3. Changes in capital quality (with new technologies this is likely to increase in
OECD); and 4. Pure technical progress. Oliveira Martins stated that only limited catch up in labour
productivity levels should be factored in projections, because a) we know little about the determinants of
multi-factor productivity growth, the most important driver of long-run labour productivity; b) labour
quality is likely to drag down productivity growth in a number of countries, unless there are massive
investments in education. This is somewhat compensated by the expectation that capital quality is likely to
push up labour productivity in most countries, especially in those that lag behind. He stressed that scope
and complementarity of policies play an important role in the convergence process and often this aspect is
not make explicit when convergence scenarios are designed. 
Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University presented on his views on development pathways and emission
scenarios. He stated that the most interesting regions to include in the GHG emission scenarios would be
the regions with the largest emission that are on track to full convergence with industrialised countries.
These are not the same regions that are interesting in terms of development. Asia (India and China) would
be the regions to look at because of the following points: (1) Asia will likely achieve converging economic
growth over the next 25 years with increasing energy use and related GHG emissions; (2) rapid growth
regions are more interesting places to reduce emissions with new technologies compared to retrofitting old
technologies elsewhere; and (3) the fast growing Asian countries have significant coal resources; how these
are used is important for emissions. Because of these reasons, Sachs stated that modelling economic
growth in an aggregated model using GDP only is not as good as capturing regional structural change,
including, for example, details on energy supply systems, land-use patterns, power plant choices, building
design, and urban design. Sachs stressed that when it comes to technological development, the question of
who pays for this development is an important issue. From the point of equity, this should be paid by
developed regions. This is often not included in models. Sachs mentioned another issue that should be
incorporated in emission scenarios and could become important for development: the feedback from
climate change. Examples of this are water stress, desalination, variation in energy use (heating and
cooling), changes in agricultural productivity and land-use changes. He also suggested that modellers
should develop crisis scenarios, for example where energy resources become scarce. As a final remark he
stated that fine-tuning economic development at an aggregated level is not that important for emission
scenarios; scenarios usability is rather limited due to the aggregation of important underlying factors. More
effort should be put in disaggregating the scenarios. 
Discussion
The discussion started with methodological questions on relations between demographics and emissions.
It was suggested that there might be different approaches to link income distributions to demographic
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change and indirectly to emissions. O’Neill answered that he has done this by linking income distribution
effects to fertility and mortality rates. Another important issue that might have an impact is the recent
insight that people take along their lifestyles from younger ages throughout their lives. This might have
substantial impacts on projected consumption patterns. Also inter-regional migration might have impacts
on emission scenarios, but this has not yet been studied adequately. There are also many linkages between
level of education between regions and distribution of investment. It might be worth looking at this when
modelling development at a regional level. 
The issue of technology development and diffusion was also raised. There is a reason to believe that in
Asia, for instance, the growth patterns will change from technology importing to technology development.
The share of R&D in GDP would then increase. This could have important implications for the rate of
innovation and capital investment. 
2.5 Session 4: How to treat different economic approaches in the AR4?
Chair: Ken Ruffing, OECD
Speakers: John Weyant, Stanford University, PPP vs MER in EMF implications for climate scenario
development 
Hans Timmer, World Bank, PPP vs MER: a view from the World Bank
John Weyant, Stanford University, presented the implications for climate scenarios of the economic
approach used: PPP versus MER. A number of modelling teams that developed the IPCC SRES scenarios
did experiments with both approaches. The first point to note is that best practice can differ between
making historical welfare comparisons and model projections of GDP, energy and carbon emissions. He
stated that to compare current and past incomes between countries PPPs are preferred, although they are
far from perfect. When making long-run global economy-energy-environment projections he
recommended working in local currencies for as long as possible and using basic drivers of economic
growth rather than reduced form convergence formulations. Weyant recommended using MERs or PPPs
consistently, especially in implementing convergence assumptions, but referred to Nordhaus’, earlier
statement that a complication in using PPPs is how to re-estimate structural economic relationships based
on PPP data when the required PPP data is generally not available. Weyant concluded that the SRES
scenarios are probably correct when climate change or its impacts are of interest, whether PPP or MER was
used. However there could be significant differences for mitigation cost projections depending on the
method of GDP convergence. Most studies on projections using both conversion methods that get
significantly different results have not made all appropriate adjustments in their structural relationships.
Important to note is that trade effects may cause further complications.
Hans Timmer, Worldbank, in his joint presentation with Andrew Burnes, started by stating that he will
come up with different conclusions than Bill Nordhaus. He argued that there is nothing wrong about using
the MER method as long as this is done for the right applications. He raised three questions: 1. Why do we
use PPPs in international comparisons of poverty and living standards? 2. Why do we use MERs in growth
and economic analysis? 3. Which is better, PPPs or MERs in convergence scenarios? He discussed these
questions based on a very simple example of two hypothetical countries (one poor, one rich) and two goods
(tradable and non-tradable). For certain economic expenditures analyses MERs are preferred, for example
when analysing the economic importance of low-income countries, remittances, and energy. The impact of
an oil-price hike, payable in international currency, is larger for poor countries. When estimating economic
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growth, MERs are used because of consistency in national accounting. Timmer’s summary included the
following key points: (1) Use different method for different purposes; (2) One should not mix methods,
especially within a modelling framework; (3) One should not apply national account growth rates to PPP
based income levels to avoid over-stating poor-country incomes at convergence; and (4) Model explicitly
relative-price developments.
Discussion
In the methodological discussion, Hans Timmer explained that in his examples he uses the full PPP method
and not the so called Superlative PPP method recommended by Nordhaus. He supported the idea advocated
by Nordhaus and Weyant that one should use MER national accounts in growth rate analysis and PPP based
income levels as the starting point for country comparisons; 
2.6 Wrap up discussions and conclusion of day 1
Chair: Bert Metz, co-chair IPCC WGIII
Panel: Emilio La Rovere, Federal University, Rio de Janeiro
Ken Ruffing, OECD
Bill Nordhaus, Yale
The main issue discussed was whether the SRES scenarios can still be used in the AR4 assessment given
the recent population projections and the PPP vs MER issue. One important notion was that they cover the
range of the latest emission scenarios quite well, which indicates they are certainly valuable for the AR4.
Many participants stressed the point that while there may or may not be a difference in emissions
projections depending on the use of either MER or PPP, there are many other variables that will have a
much greater influence emissions and resulting temperature projections. These variables which include
population growth, technological development and deployment, and climate sensitivity deserve much more
attention than the PPP/MER debate.
Issues that were raised include the following:
On PPP vs MER:
• The difference in projected economic growth between using MER or PPP in a consistent manner for
SRES convergence scenarios is not known. New model approaches, calibrations, and model runs would
be required for this analysis. 
• For consistent comparisons of long-term economic growth between countries both PPPs and MERs
should be used in a combined method as proposed by Nordhaus
• Convergence scenarios should also address the relationship between PPP exchange rates and MER
which depends on productivity trends at the sector level; thus, the PPP/MER ratio should be
endogenous.                                                 
• There is an indication that the emissions are not very much affected by the use of PPP or MER, because
of the offsetting effect of rates of change of energy intensity and carbon dioxide intensity (if these are
expressed in the same metric). It seems that the chosen approach may have more impact on the
assessment of mitigation and abatement costs.
• Regarding the impact of the use of PPP vs MER on mitigation and adaptation costs, this would not be
a problem if the analysis was country specific. To the extent welfare considerations are made across
countries, then there may be a larger issues in the aggregation problem.
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On population, development pathways and convergence
• We see a downward trend in population projections compared to SRES in recent literature. Furthermore,
the changing household structure and age structure could be important for scenarios.
• Regarding convergence it is important to consider not only the degree of converge (in incomes) but it
is also necessary to spell out policies required to sustain required high productivity rates.
• Thinking through so called crisis scenarios could be a very interesting exercise, e.g., abrupt climate
change scenario.
• On the issue of the difference between baseline and policy scenarios it was stated that it is important to
be clear and transparent on what policy assumptions have been made in the baseline scenarios when
there are emerging climate policies.
2.7 Session 5: Climate and impact scenarios: Evaluating climate impacts and
analyzing adaptation options. 
Chair: Tom Kram, RIVM
Speakers: Reto Knutti, UCAR, Evaluating climate impacts with intermediate models
Monirul Mirza, University of Toronto, The Use of SRES for Vulnerability, Impacts and
Adaptation Assessments
Ferenc Toth, IAEA Climate change mitigation: Costs and avoided damage
Reto Knutti, UCAR, showed the importance and possibilities of climate models of intermediate
complexity. He showed that these models are the linkages between simple climate models and GCMs. A
limitation for climate modelling is often computing power. Knutti showed the differences in computing
time for two GCMs and intermediate models. The intermediate complexity models run in the order of
minutes to hours, compared to several weeks or months for some GCMs. Knutti has run his intermediate
complexity model and has analysed the significance of several assumptions (sensitivity analysis). Key
assumptions for sea level rise in stabilisation scenarios turned out to be the ocean mixing rate, climate
sensitivity and the stabilization level, while for surface warming ocean mixing matters only for the
transient evolution of climate. Knutti also showed the use of intermediate complexity models for
probability estimates as they are suitable to run hundreds or thousands of simulations, because of the short
running time. The climate impacts community needs emission scenarios to translate these into climate and
impacts, and intermediate models can be useful for such impact studies. Knutti presented examples of this
type of analysis for the possible future evolution of the thermohaline circulation (THC). Typical (policy
relevant) questions that can be addressed based on these analyses are: How dangerous may a THC
disruption be for regions? When is the best time to act? Although intermediate models have many benefits,
it is important to note that the degree of detail is limited compared to GCMs.
Ferenc Toth, IAEA and Monirul Mirza, University of Toronto held a presentation on the use of SRES
scenarios for vulnerability, impact and adaptation (VIA) assessments. Climate change scenarios have a role
in impact and adaptation analysis to communicate potential consequences, to analyse the implications of
policy decisions and to facilitate the formulation of policies. But VIA assessments require socio-economic
assumptions as covered in the emission scenarios. Mirza presented several studies that have used SRES
scenarios for impact analyses. For many impact assessments, the regional resolution of the SRES report is
not sufficient and further downscaling to grid cell level is required. He presented several examples of VIA
analysis with SRES and lessons learned from the applications. SRES scenarios have been used for analyses
of biophysical, social, and economic damages, but not for assessing adaptation costs. Limitations of SRES
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include the uncertainties in the downscaling of required land-use, population and GDP data; the omission
of population migration that is important for these analyses; and the assumption of uniform regional
economic growth rates.
Ferenc Toth, IAEA/Hungary, presented on long-term adaptation versus mitigation costs in the context of
avoided damages. This is important because one can then assess the trade-off between mitigation versus
adaptation and between mitigation/adaptation efforts and avoided damages. Toth described three methods:
Cost Benefit Analysis, Cost Effectiveness Analysis and Safe-Landing/ Tolerable Windows Approach. He
explained that the definition of avoided damages as the baseline damage minus the damage with mitigation
is too simplistic. In reality it is more complicated as ancillary effects play a role. He showed examples of
Global Cost Benefit Analyses from Nordhaus and Tol. The uncertainties and problems are high when
dealing with CBA and particularly the discounting assumptions have been a controversial topic. Based on
work by Nordhaus he proposed that Cost-Effectiveness Analysis might be a better approach. This is
looking for the least-cost strategy to achieve a specific environmental target. The problem is that CEA
models do not have impact/damage modules and cannot directly say anything about benefits. Another
approach is the Safe Landing/Tolerable Windows Approach that searches for "long-term tolerable
conditions" in the climate/impact domains and converts those through backcasting into emissions
constraints. Benefits are then defined as the baseline damages minus the damages of the chosen maximum
transformation. The Zero Order Draft of the WGII contribution of AR4 includes hardly any studies
reporting bottom-up estimates of mitigation benefits and avoided damages. A message of this meeting to
the Lead Authors of WGII could be to look carefully and report regional/national benefits
mitigation/stabilization scenarios to inform mitigation decisions.
Discussion
The first point made was that there is currently no consensus in the scientific community on the quality of
available downscaling (GDP, population) data from SRES scenarios. This is a problem for VIA
assessments. Related to that, there seems to be consensus that current climate change impact models may
not be ready for much detail.
The discussion continued on climate sensitivity. It was stated that there seems to be consensus now that the
range as given by IPCC TAR (1.5- 4.5 C) remains large and recent studies have even widened the range of
uncertainty for climate sensitivity. Short term projections are however not so dependent upon climate
sensitivity, say out to 2050. 
Regarding the trade off between adaptation, mitigation and vulnerability, it was mentioned that mitigation
efforts require resources that may lead to higher vulnerability to climate change. It was furthermore
mentioned that, for vulnerability assessments, more attention might be needed for physical damages in
addition to economic damages (using multiple metrics), although there are some doubts on how
multidimensional benefits can be communicated to the policy community.
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2.8 Session 6: Simple/intermediate climate models to evaluate climate change for a
range of mitigation scenarios. 
Chair: Peter Stone, MIT
Speaker: Sarah Raper, CRU/Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research: Outline of
climate change projection chapter in AR4 WGI
Sarah Raper, CRU/Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, presented an outline of the
projection chapter of the WGI contribution to the AR4 and showed how mitigation and stabilisation
scenarios emerging out of AR4 Working Group III might be evaluated in that chapter. The projections
chapter for AR4 WG1 will draw on model results from two model inter-comparison exercises. The first
inter-comparison is for coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) and the second
is for models of intermediate complexity (EMICs). Some challenges for the interpretation of the modelling
results are: 
(1) The calculation of forcing for the different species differs between the models; (2) Differences between
models result from differences in forcing as well as differences in climate model formulation (a metric for
the latter being the climate sensitivity); (3) Gas cycle feedbacks are not generally included - in particular
there is temperature feedback on the carbon cycle of uncertain magnitude; (4) Presentation of results to
policymakers. 
The MAGICC model will be updated based on new insights from AR4. Amongst others, the new features
will include the tuning of the climate model to reproduce AOGCM results and a representation of carbon
cycle feedback uncertainties. The model will then be run to extend the results over a range of emissions
scenarios for inclusion in AR4. The emissions scenarios will include all SRES scenarios with a full
compliment of emissions and perhaps some post-SRES scenarios. To address a longer timeframe some
stabilization scenarios will be run over several centuries. For the presentation to policymakers, the use of
probability distributions may be of help. Raper showed results of a study together with Wigley that
assigned probabilities to temperature projections for different time frames. The probabilistic projections
were based on PDFs of inputs to the MAGICC model. This required assigning probabilities to the
emissions scenarios, which is a subjective choice. 
Discussion
Raper indicated that there is time before the AR4 closing deadline to do runs with simple climate models
and Working Group III may want to provide stabilization and mitigation scenarios that that are emerging
from the WGIII contribution to AR4. The runs that are planned will use historical probability density
functions on aerosols and forcing and projections are taken from there onwards. 
The discussion continued on the importance of carbon cycle feedbacks in climate models. Most
GCM/intermediate complexity models have not yet included this feedback. The Hadley model has more
extensive feedback. Other (GCM) models take the concentrations from the TAR simple climate model
calculations that do include feedbacks, so they cover feedbacks indirectly. The WGI contribution to AR4
will assess literature on feedbacks to looking at linkages between feedback in the climate and geo-chemical
cycles. This will be done more thoroughly than in TAR. All simple models used in TAR had carbon cycle
feedbacks, but each model in a different way.
A recommendation was made to include multi-gas scenarios in the WG I assessment and pay more
attention to land-use emissions given their uncertainty and magnitude. Regarding the latter it was
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mentioned that from the AOGCMs who have submitted runs thus far, two of those have included terrestrial
biosphere and changes in biosphere/real vegetation. It is not clear whether or not these have climate
feedbacks, but they include human changes to vegetation. Resolution is coarse, but albedo and surface
roughness are reflected. 
2.9 Session 7: Role of probabilistic assessments in emission scenarios 
Chair: Michael Schlesinger, University of Illinois
Speakers: Mort Webster, Univ. of North Carolina, Constructing Probabilistically-Based Emissions
Scenarios
Marty Hoffert, New York University, The disadvantages of probabilistic emission scenarios
Richard Tol, Hamburg University., Scenarios and probabilities.
Mort Webster, University of North Carolina, in his joint presentation with John Reilly, MIT, presented on
the construction of probabilistic emission scenarios. He laid out the following objectives in the design of
scenarios assessments: (1) Frame the debate; (2) Provide common assumptions; (3) Reduce the number of
cases to study; (4) Span a useful range of uncertainty; and (5) Provide a detailed storyline to enhance
communication. Webster stated that there is a debate within the scenario community whether to use
probabilistically based scenario designs or to use a deterministic storyline approach. He stated that these
two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive and proposed that deterministic storyline scenarios
can be constructed, using probabilistic uncertainty analysis. He presented a simple example for the
construction of scenarios using six basic steps: (1) conduct a sensitivity analysis of parameters; (2)
construct probability distributions for key parameters; (3) evaluate uncertainty propagation (Monte Carlo);
(4) use distributions of outcomes (emissions) to identify interesting targets; (5) find an appropriate set of
parameters that give the target emissions; and (6) choose a small set of scenarios based on combinations
of parameter assumptions and their resulting outcomes. He showed an example for steps 1 - 3 using the
MIT EPPA model showing the distribution of global CO2 emissions in 2100. Webster stated that to improve
the probabilistic design of scenarios, one should rather focus on the output (radiative forcing) than on the
input (emissions), because this would give a better coverage of the relevant ranges. In summary, there is a
need for a coherent and rigorous approach to span and communicate the range of uncertainty appropriately.
That is why probabilistic approaches have an added value. Probabilistic design approaches are not
inconsistent with a deterministic storyline approach to communication.
Marty Hoffert, New York University, presented on the disadvantages of probabilistic approaches. He
showed the huge uncertainty in the SRES and other scenarios. He also showed the outcome of a study
published in Science from Caldeira et al. on the uncertainty in climate sensitivity. His main point was that
it is better to approach the problem from the other end: how can we provide all that energy without CO2
emissions to meet different climate objectives, given different assumptions about climate sensitivities?
Hoffert stated that without assumptions on significant new sources of carbon free fuels, low emissions
scenarios cannot occur in the future. The bottom line would be that we will need 10TW emissions-free
energy by 2050 according to a (IS92e) BAU scenario and 8TW additional emissions-free energy to reach
500 ppm from IS92e BAU. Therefore, much more bottom-up technological information is needed in the
scenarios
Richard Tol, Hamburg University, gave a presentation on the likelihood of the SRES scenarios. He
reminded that the SRES scenarios were built using models that were originally designed for the analysis
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of energy policies. He stated that detailed knowledge of the energy system is not enough for scenario
building. He furthermore stated that the models used are calibrated with short-term data-sets – validation
over longer time spans was never a priority. To assess the likelihood of SRES scenarios he used a simple
Kaya Identity method. He took long-term data for 16 regions on population (1500 – 2000), GDP (1500 –
2000), energy (1960 – 2000) and carbon (1850 – 2000). These data were plotted and the mean and the
standard deviation of the growth rates were computed. He then computed the likelihood of the SRES
projections assuming a Gaussian distribution. Based on this analysis using historical growth rates he
concluded that: (1) The SRES scenarios are not equally likely; A2 is by far the most probable; (2) The
SRES scenarios do not span the range of not implausible futures; emissions may be higher as well as lower;
(3) The SRES scenarios do not correspond well with past trends, in the long run but also in the short run;
(4) All this is less pronounced for emissions (cancelling errors), but more pronounced for development;
and (5) It matters less for climate change, but more for impacts and mitigation
Discussion
The discussion focused on the use of probabilistic scenarios and some methodological issues. The data but
also the methods used by Tol were seriously criticised amongst others because they are based on the
assumption that historic conditions do apply in the future. Tol did explain that he is aware of the simplicity
of his method and admitted that the method is not mature enough to evaluate the SRES probability.
There was a request for more clarification on the complementary of the storyline and the probabilistic
approach suggested by Webster. It was explained that after selecting a storyline, probabilistic approaches
can help inform the quantification of that storyline by taking information from probabilistic analysis to
provide parameter values. However, storylines, that still are the main way to address emissions scenarios
contain certainly more elements than scenarios themselves, and contain information than cannot
necessarily be modelled. Probability assessment across storylines might not be correct. However, this issue
requires further discussion. 
An important other aspect discussed was policy intervention in scenarios. In theory it is preferred to have
a distinction between policy intervention and baseline assumption. This is difficult to establish and even
more for future analysis. In probabilistic approaches this means that policy choices should also be
described in terms of probability but that is very difficult.
2.10 Session 8: What gaps in knowledge in stabilization /emission scenarios can be
addressed in new publications, accepted before finalising AR4?
Chair: Francisco de la Chesnaye, US EPA
Speakers: Michael Grubb (Imperial College/Cambridge University), Ottmar Edenhofer (PIK), Claudia
Kemfert (German Institute for Economic Research), Technological change and the Innovation
Modeling Comparison Project (IMCP) 
Keywan Riahi (IIASA), Present and expected research activities (EMF-21) and gaps in
knowledge in stabilization/emission scenarios 
Michael Grubb, Cambridge University/Imperial College, Claudia Kemfert, German Institute for
Economic Research, and Ottmar Edenhofer , Postdam Institute on Climate Impact Research, presented on
the Innovation Modelling Comparison Project (IMCP) that focuses on improving the modelling of
technological change. Michael Grubb gave a short overview on technological change. He stated that
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technology is central to address long-term climate change. But the economics literature on technology
reflects a long-standing divergence of views on the main driver of technology change: 1) Supply /
technology push, vs 2) Demand / market pull (‘induced’). In reality, to get from idea to market requires
investment across a long and risky chain of innovation with a mix of ‘push and pull’ forces. Grubb
introduced the Innovation Modelling Comparison Project (IMCP) that aims to explore different innovation
modelling approaches and its implications for reaching different stabilisation levels, with particular
reference to: investment trajectories; mix of policy instruments; international technology spill-overs; and,
implications of uncertainty. This project is still in its early stages. Claudia Kemfert then presented the
common reporting scheme and overview of participating models. The models were classified according to
the type of technological change that is included; "learning-by-doing’; ‘learning-by-searching’; R&D
investments; ‘path dependent investments’; ‘externalities from capital accumulations’ and ‘vintage
capital’. She showed some preliminary results. The scientific challenges for the project are to improve the
model comparability; the incorporation of aspects of technological change like vintages and externalities
induced by physical and human capital accumulation; analysing implicit assumptions about technological
change; analysing the empirical relevance of different aspects of technological change; calibration and
empirical validation of the models; assessing capability of policy instruments to affect the dynamics and
direction of technological change.
Keywan Riahi, IIASA, gave a presentation on current (Multi-gas Study - EMF-21) and future research
activities under the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum and gaps in knowledge in stabilization/emission
scenarios. He started with a brief assessment of SRES by comparing SRES projections with other recent
short and long-term projections (to be published by Van Vuuren & O’Neill, forthcoming). 
For the short term projections he concluded that the SRES scenario ranges are broadly consistent with
current near-term projections for most of the scenario indicators, both globally and for individual regions.
The most important changes between current insights and SRES are: (1) the upper bound estimates for
population & GDP projections, which have shifted downwards since SRES (2) F-gases, where new
inventories for the year 2000 are significantly lower compared to SRES, and (3) sulphur emissions, where
recent sulphur control legislation in some parts of the world has lead to revisions of projections of
emissions (peak earlier and at lower levels) as compared to the estimates in SRES. 
For the long-term projections he concluded that the SRES scenarios are still consistent with ranges from
the recent scenario literature. Also here the most significant difference concerns population projections,
which have shifted downwards. Moreover, some recent very high energy demand scenarios extend the
SRES range on the upper side. He showed some examples of forthcoming research, which extend the
SRES scenarios by new emissions sources and their spatial coverage. He highlighted two main extensions.
First, an increasing body of literature (Streets, et al., Smith et al., Rao & Riahi, etc.) analysing the future
prospects of black and organic carbon emissions consistent with the SRES scenario families. Riahi pointed
out that the development of future emissions scenarios for these substances is necessary as they are
contributing to radiative forcing with significant (though uncertain) climate effects. Second, he showed
new national & spatially explicit projections of drivers for economic and demographic change based on
improved methodology (RIVM, IIASA). He highlighted the importance of this downscaling information
for impact, adaptation and vulnerability assessments based on SRES.
Addressing the recent critique on the SRES scenarios concerning their economic converg e n c e
assumptions, Riahi showed a sensitivity analysis for SRES scenarios looking into the implications for
GHG emissions at slow rates of income convergence. He summarized that, in general, less economic
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convergence leads to higher emissions. As the main reasons for this he listed slower factor productivity
growth, slower capital turn-over rates as well as lower levels of adoption of advanced and cleaner
technologies in developing countries. He also highlighted that stabilization scenarios require global
application of climate policies and convergence in adoption of low emissions technologies. As a result the
consistency of low economic convergence scenarios with climate stabilization scenarios might be
questionable. Moreover, he presented a comparison of economic convergence assumptions in SRES with
regional evidence on income convergence for selected OECD regions. He concluded that the SRES
scenarios are in general consistent with empirical data, and that those SRES scenarios, where globalization
is a main element of the storyline (A1 & B1), depict extreme cases of convergence representative for the
upper bound of the uncertainty range for convergence assumptions. 
Riahi also presented some recent results from work done since the TAR within EMF-21. An important
difference with TAR is that new stabilization scenarios also include the basket of non-CO2 GHGs. Multigas
mitigation adds flexibility to reduce emissions from other sources than CO2, hence multigas stabilization
is significantly cheaper than CO2-only.
He ended his presentation by giving his view on knowledge gaps in integrated assessment modelling at this
moment, including: (1) Non-cooperative behaviour; (2) Uncertainty; (3) Endogenous technological change
(including option values of innovations); (4) Climate feedbacks); (5) Location-specific vs. regional &
global mitigation/adaptation; and (6) How to construct emissions scenarios with PPP-parameterization
Discussion
It was clarified that the deadline for new literature to be included in the WGIII contribution to AR4 is
“accepted for publication” before July 2006 (i.e. when the Second Order Draft goes out for review). The
rationale is that reviewers need to be able to trace underlying sources and read it for themselves. The results
of EMF-21 will be published on time for the AR4. For EMF-22 this is uncertain. There is some work
ongoing on land use, which should be ready in some form for AR4. Other work in progress is on
stabilization scenarios, but it is uncertain if that is ready on time. 
Some discussion emerged on the issue of the impacts of slow convergence scenarios. Riahi had shown
historical convergence data at country level within three OECD regions; US, Japan, Europe, and compared
these with SRES world regions convergence under these conditions. It then is essential what has been
assumed within the respective regions about factors like currency and movement of labour. Regarding
convergence, it was explained that the main reason why less convergence leads to higher emissions is that
the reductions in carbon intensity will also be slower. Convergence is not an absolute prerequisite for
stabilization, but in very poor regions it would probably be very difficult to get agreement on shared global
climate targets without convergence. 
It was observed that for the IMCP it is important to be transparent on what is included in the models on
methods for the modelling of endogenous technological change and on for instance carbon cycle
feedbacks. Also when comparing the models it is considered important to acknowledge that there are
differences between the models. 
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2.11 Session 9: Role of technology development in long-term mitigation and
stabilization scenarios.
Chair: Mikiko Kainuma, NIES
Speakers: Sjak Smulders, Tilburg University, Modelling endogenous technological change; a reflection
for emission scenario builders
Jae Edmonds, PNL: Technology and climate stabilization 
P.R. Shukla, Indian Institute of Management: The role of endogenous technology development
in long-term mitigation and stabilization scenarios, a Developing Country perspective 
Ernst Worrel, LBL, The use and development of bottom up technological scenarios 
Sjak Smulders, Ti l b u rg University, presented an econometric approach to model endogenous
technological change. He showed what lessons can be learned from simple models. He gave a brief
overview of economic models: partial equilibrium; general equilibrium models; growth models. The
characteristics of an ideal model are: (1) general equilibrium; (2) inclusion of technological learning versus
push by research and development; (3) inclusion of technology diffusion and innovation; (4) inclusion of
different directions of technological change like reductions in unit abatement cost, production cost,
emission intensity; (5) coverage of integrated and end-of-pipe technologies; (6) should have general
production functions. Based on his discussion he concluded that (1) modelling R&D realistically requires
inclusion of market power, which implies that there are distorted incentives for innovation; (2) when
opportunity costs of R&D and learning expenditures are properly included in the models, the introduction
of induced technological change most likely leads to an increase in the cost of a climate policy, rather than
a decrease that many models are showing. 
Jae Edmonds and Leon Clarke, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, began by noting that technological
change is central to the issue of dealing with climate change and plays a crucial role in simultaneously
achieving environmental goals and controlling costs. As a consequence, the ways by which technologies
change and improve have generated renewed interest and have implications for near-term decision-making,
including for example, emissions mitigation, RD&D investments and policies, and the cost of achieving
environmental goals. The problem is that the pathways by which technology is created, developed and
deployed are varied and poorly understood. There is a rich literature whose roots predate general interest
in anthropogenic climate change, which has explored the sources of technological change. While this
literature has failed to produce a simple deterministic representation for technological change, it has
produced a variety of useful insights. It has demonstrated that induced environmental innovation is a
reality, but it has also shown that technology advances in part as a function of activities originating outside
of the sector ("spillovers"), which are largely unresponsive to climate policies. Further, it has demonstrated
the existence of both R&D-based advance and experience-based advance (e.g., learning-by-doing). The
relative importance and precise nature of each of these factors is not well understood. GHG emissions
models incorporate technology and technological change either explicitly or implicitly. The present
generation of models treats technological change simplistically, often neglecting important sources of
advance. Therefore, their associated analysis is subject to misspecification errors. Any simple deterministic
model of technological change will likely lead to incomplete or erroneous implications at some point. The
goal in modelling the influence of technological change on emissions and abatement costs should be to
develop representations of technological change that build on a broader framework.
P.R. Shukla, Indian Institute of Management, presented on the role of endogenous technology
development in long-term mitigation and stabilization scenarios from the perspective of a developing
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country. He stated that it is important to recall that growth models assume: perfect markets; perfect
property rights; and enforceable contracts. Whereas real world development can only be understood when
considering: dual economy; multiple transitions; informal activities; subsistence production; poor market
performance; disequilibrium conditions; non-commercial fuels; non-economic concerns; and, policy
distortions. This means there is a big gap between current models and realities in developing countries. The
drivers for technological change in developing countries are 1) the international labour market: the wage
differentials, income gaps and migration; 2) human capital; 3) knowledge flows, including shifting
comparative advantage in knowledge services and the role of local and contextual knowledge; 4)
governance, risks and investment flows. To include technological change for developing regions in models,
the representation of the economy should include development processes and scenarios should cover at
least the international labour market, human capital and local and contextual knowledge. Furthermore he
suggested aligning development (endogenous change) and climate (induced change) policies.
Ernst Worrell, LBL/Ecofys, presented on the use and development of bottom-up technological scenarios.
He mentioned that policymakers rely on models to evaluate, ex-ante, the potential effects of certain
developments and policy-choices. Current IAMs lack a disaggregated representation of activity, end use,
and technology. However, mitigation activities—and policies—depend on specific attributes of sectors,
regions, and end-use technologies. Important for the WGIII contribution to the AR4 is that the chapters 4
-10 have to assess sectoral mitigation potentials. Therefore they need consistent baselines with sufficient
detail on for instance, emissions, technology and efficiency, type of activities, energy end-use, assumed
energy prices, etc. SRES scenarios have limited disaggregation information on these aspects. For AR4
disaggregated scenarios are therefore needed, either from bottom-up data in models or by disaggregating
top-down scenarios. He showed an example for China where a B2 scenario has been disaggregated. He also
discussed several models that use various forms of bottom-up representation of end-use and technology,
e.g. AMIGA (Argonne National Laboratory) and the World Energy Model (International Energy Agency).
Generally these models cover medium term time ranges (until 2030), and include detailed representation
of activity and efficiency levels on a regional basis. Unfortunately, end-use data are difficult to collect,
evaluate and assemble. Many sources cover certain regions or sectors in detail, and some groups have made
significant progress in assembling comprehensive global databases, but a consistent, well-documented
database that covers all regions and all sectors is lacking. LBL started an initiative on a shared resource:
the Global Energy Demand (GED) Database. This will be a collaboratively designed and created resource,
for the use of all contributors. Each sector in each region will be built up from detailed data on energy
consumption, technology, and drivers. Participating modelling groups and data availability will determine
GED Database content. Users will be free to determine applications. 
Discussion
The feeling, expressed by several participants after the presentations, was that the area of endogenous
technological change is very complex and not yet well understood. There is a gap between the theoretical
models and the empirical data. There seemed consensus on the need for bottom-up technology information
in emission scenarios. There is a need for more empirical research, the more detail the better, and only then
theoretical models can be validated. It was mentioned that many models handle the amount of
technological change in an aggregated way, while it would be important to distinguish among volume and
distribution of technological changes. It was also observed that all economies are far away from their
efficiency frontier; getting closer would require innovation. This would not only be technological but also
institutional innovation.
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2.12 Session 10: Analysis of multi-gas mitigation and stabilization scenarios, and
related issues of gas weighting procedures. 
Chair: Henry Jacoby, MIT
Speakers: Detlef van Vuuren, RIVM, Multi-gas stabilization scenarios
Kejun Jiang, Energy Research Institute, Multi-Gas mitigation analysis by IPAC
Rich Richels, EPRI, Developing stabilization targets
Detlef van Vuuren, RIVM, presented a comparison of multigas and CO2-only mitigation strategies based
on work that was done as part of the Energy Modelling Forum (EMF-21). He explained that there has been
a change in focus in the research community since the TAR towards multi-gas scenarios. In 2000, non-CO2
gases represent about 25% of the emissions – a first indication that considering these gasses in mitigation
strategies might be important. In that context, for EMF-21, the aim was to conduct a comprehensive, multi-
gas policy assessment to improve the understanding of the effects of including non-CO2 GHGs (NCGGs)
and sinks (terrestrial sequestration) into short- and long-term mitigation policies. A large number of
modelling groups and technology experts participated in the study, including 21 climate, economic and
integrated assessment models and various U.S. and European non-CO2 experts. Including non-CO2 gasses
into models immediately leads to three fundamental questions: (1) What are relevant targets for (multigas)
scenarios (temperature, radiative forcing, concentrations)? (2) On what basis does one substitute among
different gasses (GWP, cost-optimisation)?); and (3) How does one incorporate the information on non-
CO2 abatement options in assumptions on technology development beyond 2020? Another question
emerging from the EMF exercise is whether the potential for NCGG reduction should be restricted to 10-
20% (as is currently assumed) or is it (at high carbon costs) possible to reduce much higher percentages of
NCGG emissions? In the study, the models have handled these questions differently.
The EMF-21 results give some tentative answers to these questions. The first results showed the role of
CO2, CH4, N2O and Fluorinated-gas emissions in the baseline: the share of non-CO2 emissions over time
went from about 25% in 2000 to about 17 % in 2100. Stabilising radiative forcing at 4.5 W/m2 (the target
chosen for this comparison) in all cases required a substantial emission reduction (on average about 70%
across the models compared to 2000). In a multi-gas approach CH4 is reduced (on average) by 50%, N2O
by 25% and the F-gasses by 50-75%. As a result, the required reduction of CO2 is reduced to 60%.
(compared to 75% in a CO2 only approach). The timing of CH4 reduction strongly depends on the
optimisation method (GWP based or otherwise). Models without GWP optimisation (cost-optimisation on
the basis of the long-term target) tend to reduce CH4 only at the end of the century. Models using GWP
optimisation tend to reduce CH4 early, directly benefiting from their lower reduction costs. On average, the
marginal abatement costs decrease about 30-50% (in most models) when using a multi-gas strategy
compared to a CO2 only approach, with the strongest impact early in the period. For stringent targets most
reductions still need to come from reducing CO2 emissions.
Kejun Jiang, Energy Research Institute, presented on multi-gas scenarios for China and the world. Jiang used
the IPAC- Emissions model which is a global partial equilibrium model that covers 9 regions and 3 economic
sectors: industry, building and transport. It includes about 40 technologies and 9 gases and is run for the time-
frame to 2100. He used a reference baseline scenario, based on IPCC SRES B2, a CO2 mitigation scenario,
and a multi-gas mitigation scenario. He showed graphs for the different gases for the three scenarios.. He
showed that the carbon tax per abated ton C is about 40% lower for the multi-gas scenario in 2100. The global
G D P loss in 2100 was estimated at about 2.4 % for the CO2 only and about 1.7% for the multi-gas strategy.
For China the GDP loss in 2100 decreased from 4.5% to 3.5% if moving to a multi-gas approach. 
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Richard Richels, EPRI, noted that initial studies on the costs of stabilization focused on atmospheric CO2
concentrations primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels. More recently, the analyses have been
expanded to include non-CO2 greenhouse gases and terrestrial sequestration. The addition of other trace
gases has highlighted problems associated with the use of Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) and has led
to the exploration of alternative approaches for making tradeoffs among gases. Most recently, the
discussion has been expanded to include what constitutes an appropriate stabilization metric (e.g.,
concentrations, radiative forcing, temperature change, or impacts). Since the TAR, there have been a
number of efforts to incorporate multiple greenhouse gases into stabilization analyses. These studies
suggest that total abatement costs are reduced (in some cases substantially) when multiple greenhouse
gases are included in the abatement strategy. Although the focus of these studies was primarily on limiting
radiative forcing, the models also showed the concentration levels associated with each gas in order to meet
a particular target. 
Discussion
There was a discussion on what would be the most appropriate metric to use for the multi-gas scenarios:
equivalent-CO2 concentrations, radiative forcing, or temperature. There was a discussion on the most
appropriate metrics to be used in multi-gas scenarios, and rlate dto this, in real world climate policies. This
relates to the metrics used to define the end-points of climate policies, where alternatives are (stabilisation
of) temperature, raditaive forcing, or possible emissions. Implication of using temperature (or climate
impacts) is that one has to deal with uncertainties (in particular climate sensitivity). 
A second discussion on metrics relates to the basis of substitute among gases, which can be done by using
GWP or by cost optimisations with a particular model. It was recognized that although GWPs have been
used in various analyses, policy formulations, and are explicitly used under various requirements of the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the concept has been criticized in the literature and this critique was not
included in the TAR. A few participants strongly recommended that the AR4 should include an assessment
of the critiques of the GWPs. There was a discussion as to how the GWP issues will be addressed in the
different AR4 Working Groups. WG1 will assess GWPs and will provide new values based on the
literature. At the same time, WG1 does not have the expertise to deal with critiques that are outside the area
of climate science. The critiques of GWPs for use in economic and policy analysis do fall to WG3 where
they will be taken up. A point was made that there may need to be more than a single approach and that
some alternatives may be plausible for the short-run. Two specific points were made in this context: (1) the
use of GWP or cost optimisation for methane, which is highly relevant for WG3 due to the implications
for mitigation scenarios and costs; (2) the importance of evaluating the significance of black carbon. 
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3. Overall conclusions and key messages for the writing team
In the final session of the meeting, the CLAs of Chapter 3, Brian Fisher and Nebojsa Nakicenovic,
presented what they considered the main findings of the meeting. This section on the overall conclusions
and main findings for the AR4 writing teams includes their presentations and the discussion that followed.
The main lessons learned were divided in five themes: (1) Post-SRES scenarios; (2) the modelling of
economic growth and the treatment of PPP and MER in models; (3) the treatment of uncertainty; (4) the
role of technology on emission scenarios; (5) beyond post-SRES scenarios and what would be interesting
research questions. 
1. The comparison of post-SRES scenario literature with the SRES range provided the following insights:
• In general, the ranges are not very different; SRES seems to cover the range rather well and a
comparison can be made and explained in AR4.
• The estimated emissions (CO2) of the post-SRES scenarios have a similar lower limit and median
but a higher top end of the distribution.
• The Post-SRES scenarios differ on population assumptions. They have lower population estimates,
both in range and median. 
• There are only few scenario quantifications that used a proper PPP calibration.
• The post-SRES economic development projections (MER based) have the same lower limit and
median but a lower high end of the distribution
2. The analyses and discussion on economic growth and the use of PPP and MER in models provided the
following insights:
• A distinction needs to be made between full MER, full PPP, and Superlative PPP ("hybrid")
approaches; the hybrid approach, if properly handled, seems preferable.
• The use of PPP seems important for cross-sectional income comparisons between countries,
especially when there are large income differences.
• Convergence assumptions do affect PPP vs MER relationships which would be expected to change
over time (there has been too much focus on base year exchange rates in the recent discourse on
whether PPP or MER is a "better" metric for measuring GDP).
• PPP data are sparse (Nordhaus indicated by at least two order of magnitude) and thus do not include
all relevant information required for calibrating integrated assessment models (especially the
bottom-up approaches).
• When discussing the distinction between PPP and the MER approach in the IPCC context, the focus
of the discussion should be on its impact for emissions.
• It is unclear whether the use of PPP vs MER in post-SRES scenarios would influence the results for
the economic growth analysis. New models and new calibrations would be required for this analysis
and would be desirable although the practical difficulties should not be underestimated. 
• There is no indication at this moment that the use of PPP or MER significantly changes the results
for the aggregated emissions because of the offsetting adjustments made by most modellers in the
assumptions regarding changes in energy intensity and GHG intensity over time. There was
uncertainty whether the recently published studies that show lower emissions when PPP is used have
recalibrated their models correctly.
• The use of PPP vs MER may have more significant impact on the assessment of mitigation and
adaptation costs.
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• Regarding convergence it is important to consider not only the degree of convergence (in incomes)
but it is also necessary to spell out policies required to sustain required high labour productivity
rates.
3. Regarding the treatment of uncertainty and communication to policy makers, the following lessons
seem important:
• There are large base-year ambiguities and uncertainties that should be included in the AR4.
• It is important to span the ranges of drivers and possible emissions outcomes (different modelling
approaches).
• Explicit consideration of dependencies (covariance) is essential in probabilistic approaches.
• To build the treatment of uncertainties into emission scenarios, it is important to explore how to
achieve complementarity of probabilistic and "storyline" approaches.
• It is not clear how to assess the role of (climate) policies in probabilistic ensembles.
• A method has been proposed for characterizing probabilistic ensembles in scenario comparisons (by
medians and percentiles).
• Assessment of subjective likelihood of scenarios is one possible method for assigning probabilities
to scenarios sets, but this remains controversial and not generally accepted; so for the time being
scenario ranges remain the main way to characterize uncertainties.
• Initial comparison of Post-SRES literature with SRES uncertainty ranges indicates that they are still
broadly representative but that there are some significant changes, such as in the underlying
population projections.
• The concept of "non-intervention" (reference) scenarios seems increasingly ambiguous because of
implemented climate polices. It is therefore important to be clear and transparent on what is the
baseline scenario when there are emerging climate policies. Considering also scenarios "with"
climate policies is essential to cover the full range of emission scenarios.
• IPCC should put effort in communicating better to policy makers what are uncertainties; especially
for long-term scenarios. There is an increasing uncertainty the further emission scenarios go out in
time; clear language and transparency is therefore important. 
• It should be accepted that there will always be intrinsic uncertainties when doing long-term analysis;
attention should also be paid to scenarios on the short-term mitigation policy options and how these
can be linked to longer-term analysis. 
• Chapter 3 of WGIII contribution to the AR4 should discuss how different metrics for multi-gas
approaches influence the choices made in stabilization strategies.
4. Regarding the role of technology in emission and mitigation scenarios that the following conclusions
can be drawn:
• For characterising technological change in emission and mitigation scenarios both research,
development, deployment, diffusion and transfer are important 
• Technological change is fundamental for (reducing) stabilization (costs).
• The modelling of technological change is extremely complex (not limited to technology as such but
encompasses the boarder social framing)
• There is a gap between theoretical models and empirical data.
• There is a strong need for scenarios with more disaggregated (technology) data, especially for AR4.
• It should be studied what has been published in the literature on radical mitigation options in case
very low level stabilization would be needed.
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5. Beyond Post-SRES scenarios; new interesting research topics include:
• The impact of aging, household structure, fertility, migration, pandemics (HIV/AIDS) on emissions
scenarios.
• The use of other scales might be helpful, for instance urban/rural, location-specific, sector-specific
scales, (downscaling and bottom-up).
• Interesting regions to focus on are regions that matter most for emissions (e.g. Asia).
• Development paths and sustainability transitions; aligning of climate and development goals.
• New types for scenarios may be interesting like: Divergence of incomes (“poor stay poor”), disaster
scenarios (“fortress world”), “surprises”.
• Multi-gas issues – improve modelling of aerosols and air pollution precursors (organic and black
carbon).
• To run SRES and Post-SRES (multi-gas stabilization) sets with new simple climate models (updated
MAGICC) for inclusion in AR4; it is important to get insight in expanding the range that SRES
covers, especially regarding extremes. 
• The needs of the scenario user's community need to be addressed. In particular, the impacts and
adaptation scientific community needs regional level socio-economic data that are coherent with the
emission scenarios considered (including stabilisation scenarios).
• In both SRES and post-SRES scenarios, emissions from land-use received little attention relative to
their historic and projected future role. This issue could not be fully covered at the meting because
of lack of expertise. In AR4 it is important to pay more attention to land-use emissions given their
uncertainty and magnitude
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Should Modelers Use of Purchasing
Power Parity or Market Exchange
Rates in Global Modeling Systems?
William Nordhaus
Yale University
1. Introduction
Most global energy-economic-environment models
constructed over the last three decades have relied on
market exchange rates (MER) to put countries in a
common currency for estimation and calibration. This
approach has been the subject of considerable discussion
in recent years, and the alternative of purchasing power
parity (PPP) exchange rates has been proposed. The
present analysis reviews the issues and describes a
reconciliation of the debate.
The plan of this report is the following. After an
overview and summary of the findings, the first and
longest section reviews current practice in constructing
international accounts, with particular attention to
construction of PPP accounts. The second section
reviews the relative merits of different systems for
measures of real income and output. The third section
discusses the quality of the data in different systems. The
fourth analyzes the relative merits of different price
measures in model construction, after which issues of
convergence are addressed. The fifth then surveys the
principle arguments regarding different accounting
approaches to constructing global models. 
There are four different approaches to constructing
comparative national accounts, as shown in Figure
1. This matrix shows a two by two combination of
the exchange rate convention and the disaggregated
price convention. Here, there are two possible
approaches to converting incomes of diff e r e n t
countries: purchasing power parity exchange rates
(PPP) and market exchange rates (MER). Similarly,
there are two different sets of relative prices: actual
market prices (AMP) and International Prices (IP).
From this table, we see three potential accounting
systems:
MER accounts. The usual approach, shown in the upper
left, uses actual market prices and market exchange
rates. 
Full PPP accounts. Alternatively, we might use both
PPP exchange rates and International Prices, as shown in
the lower right entry.
Hybrid PPP accounts. A third appropriate, shown in the
upper right, uses PPP exchange rates to calculate the
aggregate outputs of different countries, but combines
these with prices and real growth rates of aggregates and
sub-aggregates measured using national prices and
weights.
As I will be suggested below, the third alternative is both
analytically most satisfactory and empirically practical.
The basic reason for this conclusion is simple: Estimates
of output or income at MER are simply wrong – they are
constructed on an economically incorrect basis. The
hybrid technique provides estimates that are consistent
both across space and across time. 
2. Major conclusions
Conclusion on PPP theory and practice: Purchasing
power parity (PPP) accounts are designed to provide
accurate estimates of "real" incomes, outputs, and
expenditures in countries with widely varying price
structures. Current practice in construction of PPP
accounts is to use multilateral indexes that estimate the
cost in a benchmark year of purchasing a nation’s
quantity bundle in other countries or at International
Prices. In most PPP accounting systems, these estimates
for benchmark years are extrapolated to non-benchmark
years using growth rates from national accounts using
national prices and quantities. Under ideal
circumstances, the hybrid technique, using PPP incomes
for estimating cross sections and national prices and
weights for calculating growth rates, will provide
accurate and consistent cross sections and time series of
real income and output. 
Conclusion on PPP and MER accuracy: Current
measures of relative outputs and incomes using market
exchange rates (MER) provide inaccurate estimates of
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relative incomes and outputs. Moreover, the errors using
MER in today’s world are large – underestimating
incomes in low-income countries by a factor of around
three relative to high-income countries. Diff e r e n t
techniques for measuring real incomes and outputs using
PPP valuations give different estimates, but they all
indicate that MER valuations are highly misleading.
While we might be reluctant to employ PPP estimates, in
this area it is better to be imprecisely right than precisely
wrong.
Conclusion on data quality: PPP accounts today are
conceptually unsettled and empirically imprecise relative
to construction of national income and product accounts
and national price indexes. PPP accounts are limited to
expenditures in a sample of countries. There are no
comprehensive PPP production accounts. Moreover, the
databases used for constructing PPP accounts are
perhaps two orders of magnitude more sparse than that
of national economic accounts and price indexes.
Conclusion on prices for model construction: For
purposes of constructing detailed global models of
energy-economy-environment, substituting International
Prices or individual-commodity PPP valuations for
actual local or national prices is not recommended. A
major problem with this approach is that local and
national behavior is conditioned by actual prices, not by
some artificial set of uniform International Prices. A
particularly important example is the response of
different countries to nationally different global warming
policies; using International Prices would defeat
attempts to measure differential national responses to
policies (such as participation or non-participation in the
Kyoto Protocol).
Conclusion on calculating convergence: W h e n
calculating convergence among different countries, we
should rely on the hybrid technique described here. That
is, convergence should use true (PPP) measures of output
differentials and growth rates at national prices. These
will provide accurate estimates of the growth factor
required for countries to attain the same output and price
structure. In making these projections, it would be best to
use consistent index calculations and data for the cross
sections and time series.
Conclusion on aggregate models: In light of current data
and conceptual limitations, the best approach for
constructing global energ y - e c o n o m i c - e n v i r o n m e n t
models would be a hybrid set of accounts that (a) uses
cross-sectional PPP measures for relative incomes and
outputs and (b) relies on national accounts price and
quantity indexes for time-series extrapolations. Under
ideal circumstances, this approach will provide accurate
and consistent cross sections and time series. In moving
to PPP cross-sectional valuations, modelers will need to
consider whether behavioral and reduced-form
relationships in the models have been correctly
estimated. However, data willing, the hybrid approach
will provide more accurate income and output estimates,
will ensure that relative incomes and outputs better
correspond to realistic magnitudes, and can ensure that
welfare comparisons among regions are more accurate.
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The role of demographics in
emissions scenarios
Brian C. O’Neill
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA), Austria &
Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown
University, USA
1. Introduction
Demographic factors are potentially important
determinants of energy use, land use, and greenhouse gas
emissions. I focus on two key issues: (1) how the outlook
for global demographic change has evolved toward
smaller, older populations relative to projections used in
the Special Report on Emission Scenarios ( S R E S ;
Nakicenovic, 2000); and (2) how demographic factors
beyond population size, such as changes in age structure,
urbanization, and living arrangements, might be better
accounted for in modelling of future energy use and
emissions.
2. Changing demographic outlook
Development of the SRES scenarios took place between
1996 and 1999, and sufficient time has now passed to
make it worth examining the consistency of these
scenarios with more recent population data and
projections. The SRES emissions scenarios used three
population projections produced in 1996 by the UN (UN,
1998, for the B2 scenario) and the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (Lutz et al., 1996,
for the A1/B1 and A2 scenarios). These projections all
had a base year of 1990. Van Vuuren and O’Neill
(submitted) show that SRES population values for 1990
and 2000 are quite close to the most recent estimates of
population size for the world and four SRES macro
regions. Substantial differences can exist at the country
level, due to updated information from censuses and
surveys, but these generally cancel out at higher levels of
aggregation.
Comparison of the population projections used in SRES
to more recent projections shows that the outlook for
future population size has generally shifted down. Thus,
while the SRES population assumptions were consistent
with the demographic outlook at the time SRES was
developed (Gaffin, 1998), in some cases they now lie
above the range of current projections. For example,
Figure 1 shows that the upper end of the SRES range for
world population, represented by the A2 scenario, lies
above the most recent high projection from the UN (UN,
2003) and the 95th percentile of IIASA probabilistic
projections (Lutz et al., 2001). The projections used for
the other three SRES storylines (A1, B1, and B2) still lie
within the current range. However, the low end of the
current range of projections is not well represented.
Comparison at a more disaggregated level shows that
global results are driven primarily by changes in the
outlook in the developing countries, due mainly to
changes in the outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle East and North Africa region, and the East Asia
region. Recent data showing lower than expected fertility
in these regions has led to less projected population
growth. In addition, a much more pessimistic view on
the extent and duration of the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-
Saharan Africa has also lowered anticipated growth in
that region.
Comparison to recent projections in the industrialized
country regions show less of a systematic difference.
Projections have shifted down substantially for the
regions included in the Former Soviet Union, but in other
regions changes are smaller. One notable contrast with
recent projections is that, by design, SRES does not
include a low population scenario for the industrialized
country region as a whole. Thus outcomes below the
median expectation in current projections are not
represented.
Partly as a result of this choice, the SRES population
assumptions also do not include a scenario in which
aging near the high end of the current range occurs in the
industrialized country regions. Since aging is driven
partly by low fertility, which is also associated with low
population growth, the lack of a low population growth
scenario implies the lack of a rapid aging scenario as
well. Thus the upper half of the current range of
plausible aging outcomes in industrialized countries is
currently not represented. For example, while Western
and Eastern Europe could have over 60% of their
population above the age of 60 by the end of the century
(Lutz et al., 2001), the most extreme SRES scenario only
reaches just above 40%. In developing country regions,
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the range of projections of aging has also shifted upward
(toward older populations), although differences with the
range covered by SRES are less pronounced.
3. Beyond population size
Most models used to develop energy and emissions
scenarios do not explicitly consider demographic factors
other than population size. One exception to this is that
in some cases, a measure of age structure is used to
define the labor input to production. However age
structure, urbanization, and living arrangements (such as
household size measured as number of members, and age
composition of household) have all been shown to be
potentially important determinants of energy demand,
and consumption more generally (O’Neill and Chen,
2002; Schipper, 1996).
Making progress in this area requires a better
understanding of the scope for future demographic
change, as well as methods for including demographic
heterogeneity within energy-economic growth models
used for emissions scenario development.
Simultaneous and consistent projections of population,
urbanization, and households is a challenging
demographic task. For China, we have recently
completed a preliminary household projection that
suggests that the next 50 years could witness a doubling
of the fraction of the population in 1- or 2-person
households (to over 25%), a decline in the proportion of
population in households of size 4+, and extremely rapid
aging. Substantial additional analysis is necessary to
support the development of alternative scenarios, in
order to bound the range of plausible outcomes. Our
initial analysis of the potential for future urbanization
suggests that current UN projections, which foresee
urbanization rising in China from 35% currently to 60%
in 2030, may be near the upper end of plausible
outcomes; substantially slower urbanization should be
considered a real possibility.
To study the effect of shifts in population composition
over time on energy demand and emissions, we recently
introduced heterogeneous households into a general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with detail in the
energy sector (Dalton et al., in prep.). We incorporated
different types of households, each with its own demand
for consumption goods, capital stock, labor supply, and
other household level variables, into the U.S. region of
the Population-Environment-Technology (PET) model
(Dalton and Goulder, 2001). The methodological
approach taken is a combination of the infinitely lived
agent (ILA) approach typical of the Ramsey growth
models used in the development of many current
emissions scenarios, and overlapping generations (OLG)
frameworks more common in economic demography.
We use projections for households grouped by age of the
household head, and construct "cohorts" of households;
i.e., the population living in households headed by
individuals belonging to particular cohorts. We assume
altruistic behavior to link cohorts that form infinitely
lived dynasties. Households in different age groups are
associated with distinct income and consumption levels,
based on data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure
Survey. Differences among age groups imply that each
dynasty is associated with a specific pattern of income
and consumption, based on its age distribution at each
point in time. These differences have implications for
e n e rgy demand, both directly and indirectly. T h e s e
dynamics, and other relationships implied by the
household projections and CES data, create interacting
effects that feedback, and forward, to influence each
dynasty’s current and future consumption and savings
decisions.
We find that including age heterogeneity among U.S.
households reduces emissions (relative to the
representative household case), by almost 40% in our
low population scenario. Effects of heterogeneity are
more modest in other scenarios, and our results show that
emissions are around 15% lower. In our preliminary
results, the most important effects are caused by
differentials in labor income across age groups that
create complex dynamics for consumption and savings.
We have also conducted analyses showing that results
are sensitive to the values assumed for the inter-temporal
substitution elasticity and the elasticity of substitution
across consumer goods.
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5. Figures
Figure 1: Global population size in billions, SRES range vs. recent projections.
Evaluating climate impacts with
intermediate complexity models
Reto Knutti
Climate and Global Dynamics, National Center for
Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado, USA
1. Introduction
Estimates of impacts as well as adaptation and mitigation
strategies related to anthropogenic climate change
require a precise understanding of the anticipated
changes as well as the uncertainties associated with
them. Numerical models are the only tools to provide
those projections of future climate. Three types of
climate models exist, although the separation is not
always clear. The most sophisticated are comprehensive
atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (GCMs).
Climate models of reduced complexity (also named
EMICs, Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity,
[Claussen et al., 2002]) are dynamically simpler than
comprehensive GCMs, although they might well be
more “complete” in terms of climate system components
that are included. Typically, EMICs are a composite of
simplified versions of atmospheric, and/or ocean models
and a suite of parameterizations for other processes.
Simple climate models, on the other hand, are usually
not stand alone models but are rather emulation models
that rely on tuning to more complex models. T h e
increasing complexity and resolution of comprehensive
GCMs increase the computational costs and limits the
number of scenarios and ensemble members that can be
calculated to typically only a few. Long-term projections
covering many thousands of years and sensitivity studies
are unfeasible. Simple models have therefore been tuned
to match the GCM responses and have been used as
substitutes to run large numbers of scenarios and
simulations [Wigley and Raper, 2001]. To bridge the gap
between GCMs and simple models and to study the
physical processes and feedback mechanisms in the
climate system, intermediate complexity models are
applied successfully to a variety of questions in past and
future climate change. Three examples are given below.
2. Long-term climate projections
Intermediate complexity models will be used to calculate
projected long-term global changes for idealized CO2
stabilization pathways in the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4). 
Preliminary results from the Bern model [Stocker et al.,
1992; Knutti et al., 2002] are shown in Fig. 1. A number
of questions can be addressed with those model runs, for
example the effect of a delayed CO2 stabilization (SP550
vs. DSP550) or the change in global sea level, an issue
that involves timescales of many centuries until a new
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F i g u re 1: Long-term projections of global mean near
surface warming and sea level rise from thermal expansion
for a series of stabilization (SP), delayed stabilization (DSP)
and overshoot-stabilization (OSP) pathways, calculated
with the Bern intermediate complexity climate model
[Stocker et al., 1992; Knutti et al., 2002]. Intermediate
complexity models around the world are supposed to run
these and many more scenarios to bridge the gap between
the GCMs and the simple climate models in AR4.
equilibrium state is reached. An intercomparison of these
results from a series of models with different sensitivities
and ocean mixing parameterizations will further allow to
study the sensitivity of these results to various parameter
settings.
3. Nonlinear changes in sea level
An intermediate complexity model was used to show
that a shutdown of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation
would have a non-linear effect on ocean heat uptake and
thus on sea level [Knutti and Stocker, 2000]. If the
Atlantic deep overturning were to stop, an issue that is
still under debate, global ocean temperature would
increase due to strongly reduced transport of cold water
from the North Atlantic into the deep ocean. This would
result in a long-term contribution to sea level of about
0.5 m, in addition to the sea level rise from global
warming itself.
4. Uncertainties in future warming
Climate model projections are inherently uncertain.
Ranges of uncertainties for the projected warming were
based on expert opinion only for many years, and only
recently new methods were suggested to objectively
quantify uncertainties [Knutti et al., 2002; Stott and
Kettleborough, 2002]. One way to derive probability
density functions or uncertainty ranges is to run many
simulations with models of intermediate complexity,
thereby taking into account uncertainties in climate
sensitivity, ocean heat uptake, radiative forcing and the
carbon cycle. Each member of this resulting multi-
thousand member ensemble is then weighted according
to agreement with the observed warming over the
instrumental period. This approach allows for a more
objective statistical estimate of global warming
uncertainty over the 21s t century than by expert
judgement only.
5. Conclusions
Given the fact that models of intermediate complexity
are relatively easy to adapt and calculate a model run
typically within minutes to hours, they are powerful tools
to be linked with impact or policy models, either directly
[Webster et al., 2003] or offline in the sense that
projections, uncertainties, or constraints found in the
climate model are implemented afterwards into impact
or economy models [Bahn et al., 2005]. However, since
many simplifications are made in these reduced
complexity models, the interpretation of results is
usually limited to large spatial scales, and these models
should not be seen as a replacements for comprehensive
GCMs. Those provide much more detailed and accurate
information, in particular on climate variability,
extremes, regional patterns, as well as on quantities other
than temperature, which are inherently more complex to
model.
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F i g u re 2: Surface warming, strength of the thermohaline
c i rculation and sea level from thermal expansion in two
idealized global warming simulations with the Bern
intermediate complexity model. Climate sensitivity in the
two cases is chosen close to a threshold and is slightly higher
f o r the blue (dashed) case. Although equilibrium surface
warming is essentially the same for both cases, sea level rise
is more than 0.5 m higher if the thermohaline circ u l a t i o n
stops. Figure adapted from [Knutti and Stocker, 2000].
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F i g u re 3: Observed global mean near-surface warming over
the instrumental period (black) and projected changes for
IPCC SRES B1(blue) and A2 scenarios (red), calculated
with the Bern intermediate complexity model. Uncert a i n t i e s
given by the blue and red band mark the 5 to 95%
confidence range and are derived from a multi-thousand
m e m b e r ensemble, taking into account uncertainties in
radiative forcing, ocean heat uptake and climate sensitivity.
The observed surface warming [Jones and Moberg, 2003]
and ocean heat uptake [Levitus et al., 2000] were used to
constrain the ensemble over the years 1860 to 2000. Figure
adapted from [Knutti et al., 2002]
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1. Introduction
Scenarios of climate change have been used by the
vulnerability, impact and adaptation (VIA) community
for many years in a number of roles. In 2000,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
released “Special Report on Emission Scenarios
(SRES)” (IPCC, 2000) which explored pathways of
future greenhouse gas emissions, derived from self-
consistent sets of assumptions about energy use,
population growth, economic development, and other
factors (see below for details). In recent times, there is an
increasing effort of use of SRES in global and regional
biophysical impact assessment studies (Arnell, 2004;
Rosenzweig et al., 2004; Nicholls, 2004). In doing so,
some V I A researchers encountered a number of
problems. Efforts are undergoing also to identify
threshold GHG concentrations to avoid dangerous
impacts (ECF, 2004). Policymakers may be interested to
know about trade off between a certain
mitigation/adaptation effort and the avoided damages
compared to a baseline situation. In these contexts, this
brief paper has two specific objectives. First, it
summarizes the relationships between the information
required for conducting climate change impacts,
adaptation, and vulnerability assessments and the
information available in the SRES scenarios. Second, to
discuss impact/adaptation assessments based on the post-
SRES mitigation scenarios. 
2. General features of the IPCC SRES
Scenarios
The SRES scenarios cover a finite and a very wide range
of future emissions. The approach involved the
development of a set of four alternative scenario
families-A1, A2, B1 and B2 comprising 40 SRES
scenarios (Nakicenovic, 2000). From SRES, six
illustrative “marker” scenarios (Figure 1) were selected
for use in the climate projections of the IPCC Third
Assessment Report. 
Scenario descriptions
Global integration Regionalism
A1B-Balanced energy
Economic A1FI-Fossil fuel intensive A2
emphasis A1T-hightech renewables
Environmental B1 B2
emphasis
Figure 1. SRES storylines and six illustrative “marker”
scenarios. Source: Taylor et al., 2003.
3. Features of SRES scenarios relevant to
the assessments of impacts, adaptation,
and vulnerability
According to the IPCC Terms of Reference, the SRES
scenarios focus on key driving forces that shape future
socio-economic development, the availability and use of
energy resources, and the evolution of other sources of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The foundations of
the SRES scenarios are assumptions about the evolution
of the global population, economic growth, and the
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distribution of incomes between developed and
developing countries. Although land-use changes are
primarily intended to underpin land conversion, land-
use, and agriculture-related emissions, the direction and
magnitude of changes in the main land-use categories are
important clues for sectoral impact and adaptation
assessments concerning the evolution of agriculture and
forestry under the four scenarios. 
4. Applications of SRES and other socio-
economic and technological scenarios
for vulnerability, impact and
adaptation assessments
An increasing number of climate impact assessment
projects extend their scope and attempt to superimpose
biophysical impacts of different climate change
scenarios onto different socio-economic conditions that
might prevail by the time those impacts are expected to
manifest themselves. A number of attempts have recently
been made to use the SRES scenarios in vulnerability,
impact and adaptation assessments.
US National Assessment: In 1997, the United States
initiated its first comprehensive national assessment of
potential consequences of climate variability and
change, completed in 2000 (U.S. Global Change
Research Program, 2000). For this assessment, which
included twenty regional assessments and five sectoral
assessments, emission scenarios were taken from IPCC
sources and Hadley Centre and Canadian Centre for
Climate Modelling efforts. Based on the SRES
storylines, the study team created three internally
consistent socio-economic scenarios considering high
and low economic growths and thirteen economic
sectors. Under the scenarios, population, income and
employment information are generated at county levels
until 2050 and at national level until 2100.
The United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme
(UKCIP, 2001): The UKCIP team developed a scenario
framework for use in various regional and national
climate impact assessment studies. Its conceptual
foundations are similar to those of IPCC SRES: the
range of possible futures is structured into four quadrants
by two axes that are declared to represent diverging
orientations of socio-economic development:
consumerism versus community orientation and
autonomy versus interdependence. The resulting four
quadrants partly coincide with the four SRES storylines:
world markets (A1), national enterprise (A2), global
sustainability (B1), local stewardship (B2). 
EU ACACIA Project: A similar exercise was carried out
at the scale of the European Union (EU) as part of the
Europe Acacia Project (Parry, 2001). The A c a c i a
scenarios draw on both the SRES and UKCIP storylines
and use their internal logic to contemplate the future of
climate-sensitive sectors in Western Europe in the period
2020-2080. They delineate the four futures in five main
dimensions: political, economic, social/environmental,
technical, and regional aspects. The Acacia scenarios
also outline policy changes at the EU level that are likely
or outright unavoidable given the logic of the underlying
global storyline. These scenarios are certainly worth
considering in national and sub-national climate
impact/adaptation studies because they provide a useful
link between the global socio-economic scenarios in
SRES and the national or regional scenarios required for
the climate impact project.
AIACC Projects: A different case is an effort to inform
Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate
Change (AIACC) in multiple developing regions and
sectors. The AIACC has commissioned climate change
impact and response studies in priority countries and
regions, both to provide valid information about impacts
and to strengthen developing capacities to conduct such
research (see www.aiaccproject.org). There is a wide
range of SRES, downscaling methods and resolution is
considered for these projects, which are distributed over
Asia, Latin America and Small Island States. When
contacted about this, Dr Neil Leary, Science Director of
the AIACC particularly mentioned two points. First, the
main emphasis of the AIACC projects is focusing on past
climate variability and extremes and related vulnerability
and adaptation. Second, although the projects’ leaders
have been advised to consider construction and
application of future climate scenarios as a capacity
building exercise but it is not a major thrust. 
The development of national or regional socio-economic
scenarios for assessments of climate impact and
adaptation studies by using the global SRES scenarios is
IPCC Expert meeting on emission scenarios, 12-14 January 2005, Washington DC
ANNEX II: EXTENDED ABSTRACTS OF PRESENTATIONS
39
relatively easy task. The driving forces and the cross-
boarder linkages of the national scenarios must be
consistent with the underlying logic of the corresponding
global storylines but, as presented above, there is a
considerable degree of freedom in depicting the national
futures. The situation is entirely different when a set of
national and regional scenarios derived from global
storylines is used for a global scale impacts/adaptation
study. In this case, the logical consistency of the national
scenarios with their global sources is necessary but not
s u fficient: the quantitative characterization of the
disaggregated driving forces must also match the
original global scenario quantification. This requires
more rigorous procedures for “downscaling” global
scenarios. Arnell et al. (2004) and Gaffin et al. (2004)
recently attempted downscaling of SRES socio-
economic data at country levels and they encountered a
number of problems among which particularly important
are: use of regionally averaged population and GDP
growth rates. Their application at country level may
produce unrealistic population and GDP scenarios. There
are also problems of population discontinuity after 2050
for the A1 and B1 scenarios which may not be the case
for all countries. Downscaling the land-use change
components of the SRES scenarios appear to be more
problematic because they are calculated by the integrated
assessment models used in the SRES process and the
projections diverge widely even under the same
storyline. Considering the limitations, examples of
application of the SRES in the water, food production
and coastal flooding are given below.
Water Resources: Arnell (2004) applied SRES socio-
economic and climate scenarios projected by six climate
models driven by SRES emissions. These models are:
HadCM3, ECHAM4, CGCM2, CSIRO, GFDL a n d
CCSR. Following time-slices were used for the
assessment: 30-year mean climate relative to 1961-1990
by the 2020s (2010-2039), 2050s (2040-2069) and 2080s
(2070-2099). A macro-scale hydrologic model with a
resolution of 0.5 x 0.5° was run to simulate present and
future climates on monthly basis and average annual
runoff was derived. Population was derived at watershed
levels under each population growth scenario. Finally,
indicators of water resources stress for each watershed
were calculated from the simulated runoff and estimated
population. 
As a result of decrease in runoff, climate change may
increase water stresses in some parts of the world
including the Mediterranean, in parts of Europe, central
and Southern America, and southern Africa. T h e
problem of South and Eastern Asia is different from
these regions as most of the runoff will occur in the
monsoon and that may not be available during the dry
season which may result in water stress. By 2050, under
the A2 population scenario, between 1092 and 2761
million people may experience increase in stress. On the
other hand for the B2 scenario, the range is 670-1538
million. Note that population assumptions under these
two SRES played a dominant role in generating the
effect compared to the emission scenarios.
Food Supply: Parry et al. (2004) analyzed the global
consequences of SRES socio-economic and emission
scenarios to drop yields, production and risk of hunger.
They applied climate change scenarios projected by the
HadCM3 model with regard to SRES A1F1, A2, B1, and
B2 emissions. Transfer functions were derived from crop
model simulations with observed data and projected
climate change scenarios and were used to calculate
projected changes in yield. In order to evaluate
consequent changes in cereal production, cereal prices
and the number of people at risk, the basic linked system
(BLS) was used. Some adaptation measures were also
considered in the analysis which includes particularly
planting date, and application of additional fertilization
and irrigation. The greatest decrease in yields is expected
under the A1F1 scenario which will produce larg e
increase in global temperature. Under the A2 ensemble
scenario, the contrast between the developed and
developed countries is the largest while the least contrast
is visible under the B1 and B2 scenarios. 
Coastal Flooding: Due to sea level rise in future,
flooding in the coastal areas in many parts of the world
and loss of coastal wetland could emerge as serious
problems. Nicholls (2004) examined these issues in the
context of four SRES storylines-A1F1, A2, B1 and B2.
With these scenarios, the HadCM3 model projects global
mean sea level rise (relative to 1990) in the range of 22
cm (B1) to 34 cm (A1F1) by 2080s. Flood incidence
from surges will increase until 2020 under all scenarios
because of lagged improvement in defence standards. By
2080s, the incidences of flooding may decrease due to
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increased investment in defence standards. The estimates
are: £ 5 million people/year (B2), £ 2 million people/year
(B1) and £ 1 million people/year (A1F1). However, the
A2 world is disappointing under flooding incidence will
continue to occur until 2080 and estimated vulnerable
population is 18-30 million. Sea level rise increases
flooding impacts for all scenarios, however, significant
impact will emerge by 2080. By this date additional
impacted people are: 7-10 million (A1F1), 29-50 million
(A2), 2-3 million (B1) and 16-27 million (B2).
Maximum wetlands (5-20%) will be lost under the A1F1
scenario. 
5. Use of Stabilized/Long-Term Response
Scenarios
It is now assumed that the equivalent of doubling
atmospheric CO2 will occur by 2050. Land surfaces and
higher altitudes will experience larger increases.
Temperatures will continue to rise long after emissions
are reduced and greenhouse gas concentrations stabilize.
However, it is important to stabilize emissions of GHGs
to reduce vulnerability to adverse effects of climate
change and sea level rise. Stabilization has a number of
benefits, viz.: global distribution of benefits; benefits
will spread over decades to centuries; will reduce cost of
adaptation; will allow longer time-scale for adaptation to
succeed; and will reduce threats to many vulnerable
unique ecosystems.
5.1 Climate and Sea Level Changes under the
Stabilized Scenarios
Schlesinger and Malyshev (2001) examined near-surface
temperature and sea level for the post SRES CO2
stabilization scenarios. They examined seven
stabilization scenarios with their corresponding SRES
marker scenarios-A1, A1S550, A1/S650, A 2 / S 5 5 0 ,
A2/S750, B1, B1/S450, B2 and B2/S550 (S denotes the
stabilized CO2 concentrations). The experiments indicate
a range of reductions in temperature and sea level rise
under all stabilized scenarios. Example, for the S550
stabilization scenarios, the reductions in global warming
and sea level rise in 2100 range from 0.29°C and 3.31 cm
for B2/S550 with ΔT2x = 1.5°C to 1.23°C and 11.81 cm
for A2/S550 with ΔT2x = 4.5°C. Spatially the near-
surface temperature changes under the B2/S550 in 2100
were found to be smaller than those for the B2 scenario.
The values vary from about 0.3°C in the tropics to 0.5°C
over Antarctica and 07°C in the Arctic.
5.2 Potential Impacts on Agriculture and Human
Health
Mikiko et al. (2004) assessed the impacts of stabilized
scenarios on agriculture and human health in South and
South east Asia. Under the EMF 19 scenarios, they found
that productivity of wheat would decrease significantly
in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Korea-PDR, Burma and other
tropical countries. Decrease in rice productivity is also
expected in most countries with exceptions in Bhutan
and Taiwan, which may experience in decrease. The
productivity decrease in India is projected to be the
highest. 
Mikiko et al. (2004) indicated that global warming
would result in increasing temperature and changing
vegetation close to the ground. This modified
environment would allow the anopheles mosquito, the
malaria vector, to increase its population. Although
under the 550 stabilized scenarios temperature increase
will be smaller than that of the reference (B2) scenario,
the population living in the areas at malarial risk will be
doubled in 2100 as against the 1990 level.
6. Concluding Remarks
SRES the only starting point for national VIA studies.
For any such study there are two main components for
which scenarios need to be constructed: First, space and
general direction of development: population, incomes,
education & human capital, social relations, institutions,
technologies; and second, future evolution of climate-
sensitive sectors: agriculture, water resources, coastal
areas, forestry, ecosystems. In this context the challenge
is to minimize the uncertainty when downscaling the
information at country level/catchment level using the
large SRES regional values.
Migration/relocation of people is very important for VIA
assessments. In developed countries there has been a
tendency of movement of people to the flood plains and
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coastal areas. In developing countries migration occurs
between rural and urban areas.
Equity is another important issue that need to be factored
into VIA assessments. Equity could be of many forms:
intra- and inter-generational, geographic, income groups,
gender, etc. A country may have plenty of water but
some regions are deprived of that resource. High-income
group uses much more water than the low-income
groups, etc.
Bottom-up approach for scenario construction may
be more suitable but may emerge as a big challenge
when comparing regional and global consistency
with the SRES storylines. 
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Climate change mitigation: Costs and
avoided damages
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The mandate of this short paper is to evaluate long-term
adaptation-mitigation costs in the context of avoided
climate change related damages (corresponding to the
benefits of mitigation) and to briefly assess the literature
on remaining impacts (the rest of the climate change
costs) and adaptation options for a range of long-term
mitigation and stabilization scenarios. An OECD
conference in 2002 addressed many aspects of the
benefits of climate change mitigation (Corfee Morlot and
Agrawala, 2004a,b). This paper complements those
publications rather than summarizes them.
1. Accounting for climate change costs
and mitigation benefits
The concept of the benefits of climate change mitigation
on the impact side is straightforward. It is equivalent to
the avoided damage relative to some baseline and can be
calculated as the difference between the damages
associated with baseline or reference emissions and the
damages that result if greenhouse gas emissions are
reduced relative to the reference emissions. It follows
that in the baseline case the social costs of carbon and
other GHG emissions are equal to the properly
calculated damages. In the mitigation case, however, the
social cost of climate change and its management has
two components: the mitigation cost itself and the
damages resulting from the mitigated but not fully
eliminated climate change.
Reality is somewhat more complicated. Damage costs in
both the baseline and the mitigated cases should be
calculated as net damages that account for the damages
averted by adaptation and for the associated adaptation
costs plus for the ancillary (indirect) effects of adaptation
that can be positive or negative. The mitigation costs
should also be adjusted for the ancillary effects of
mitigation activities that can also be positive or negative.
The possibility to consider costs and benefits of GHG
mitigation and the exact form of counting and balancing
them depends on the adopted decision analytical
framework as well as on the spatial scale and the time
horizon of their applications.
2. Global Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
Integrated assessment models of climate change
conceived in a cost-benefit framework cover the full
range from economic activities and resulting emissions
(together with mitigation cost functions of reducing
those emissions) to climate change impacts and damages
in monetary units. Examples include the DICE/RICE
family of models by Nordhaus (1992) and Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000), and the FUND model by Tol (1997).
Baseline emissions and related baseline damages in CBA
models are calculated by turning off their optimization
part. This represents the case when the external effects of
GHG emissions (damages) are allowed to be ignored by
those who produce those emissions. In contrast, optimal
emissions balance the costs of GHG emissions reduction
against their benefits accruing from avoided climate
change damages. This requires a benevolent global
social planner whose goal is to maximize social welfare
which involves minimizing the sum of GHG mitigation
costs and climate change damages. Properly formulated
in a dynamic framework, CBA provides not only the
optimal level of climate change but also the temporal
path of the efficient control.
In general, results of cost-benefit models show that the
optimal path only slightly diverts from the baseline
emission path. It follows that in this framing any
diversion from the optimal path involves higher total
social costs: mitigation above or below the optimal level
reduces welfare. Specifically, mitigation beyond the
optimal level leads to welfare loss because mitigation
costs exceed the benefits, i.e., the avoided damages. Yet
several concerns have been raised about the applicability
of CBA to guide global climate policy.
3. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)
Least-cost strategy to achieve an environmental target in
general is based on the notion that beyond a certain level,
impacts of pollution becomes unacceptable irrespective
of the damages caused. It is often used in environmental
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management when the damages are manifold and
difficult to value in monetary terms. In the climate
context, the threshold or target levels are associated with
the level and/or rate of change in climatic attributes that
lead to unacceptable impacts. Triggered by Article 2 of
the UNFCCC, Working Group I of IPCC (1994) depicted
a set of emission paths that stabilize CO2 concentrations
at pre-specified levels. This was followed by the study
by Wigley et al. (1996) who show that the same
concentration targets can be achieved via alternative
paths along which the mitigation costs are significantly
lower than those of the corresponding IPCC paths.
Inquiries into cost-minimizing stabilization of CO2 or
C O2-equivalent GHG concentrations have become
widespread and subsequent years. Dozens of models,
hundreds of model runs propose cost-effective emission
paths. They are assessed in Chapters 2, 8, and 10 of IPCC
(2001).
CEA models usually lack impact/damage modules and
therefore cannot say anything about benefits directly.
However, there are conceivable ways to resolve this
problem by using impact/damage information form other
models. One possibility to calculate benefits is to take
stabilization targets and costs from CEA applications and
to get the corresponding baseline and avoided damage
estimates from other studies: e.g., from damage-modules
of CBA such as the DICE/RICE model. The difficulty is,
h o w e v e r, that damages depend not only on
environmental change but also on the affected society,
particularly on factors that determine its ability to avoid
or countervail at least some part of the climate change
damages.
Another possibility is to take CEA stabilization targets
and costs and to use global (perhaps with some regional
resolution) damage functions, e.g., those developed by
Tol (2002). The procedure would be to calculate baseline
emissions by using the CEA model and the associated
damages by using the damage functions; to calculate the
mitigation costs along the least-cost stabilization path
provided by the CEA model; to estimate the climate-
dependent damages along this stabilization path; and to
take the difference between the damages under
unrestricted emissions and those under mitigation to
calculate the benefits of cost-efficient stabilization.
4. Safe-landing/Tolerable windows
approach (SL/TWA)
The search for limits beyond which anthropogenic
interference with the climate system might become
“dangerous” extends the question of long-term
stabilization targets into the domain of climate attributes
(temperature and precipitation change) and impacts.
Given their distinctive formulation of the decision
problem, the Safe landing and the Tolerable windows
approaches have established themselves as a separate
decision analytical framework. The main objective of the
safe landing analysis (SLA) (Alcamo and Kreileman,
1996; Swart et al., 1998) is to establish ranges of near-
term emissions called Safe Emissions Corridors that
keep long-term climate change (i.e., long-term
stabilization objectives) within predefined limits. The
safe emission corridor determines a range of possible
near-term (for the next decade or two) GHG emissions
levels that includes at least one long-term (century-scale)
emissions path that satisfies the externally defined long-
term and intermediate climate protection goals. The
latter are typically formulated as climate change features
such as the limits to the change in global mean
temperature and to its rate of change, and the limit to sea-
level rise and its rate of change. The benefits associated
with an SLA-derived emissions corridor are difficult to
measure. Even if near-term emissions remain in the pre-
specified range, the long-term actual paths can still
progress towards different targets in diverse ways and
accrue widely diverging damages. One possible
approach might be to measure the SLA-related benefits
in terms of option value, i.e., the value of keeping open
the possibility not to exceed certain magnitudes and rates
of climate change.
The Tolerable Windows Approach (TWA; see Toth, 2003)
calculates long-term emission corridors that secure certain
benefits under a cost limit, both specified by the user of
the model to represent personal judgment or social
preferences. Climate impact response functions (CIRFs)
describe the relationships between relevant environmental
variables (e.g., incremental temperature, precipitation, and
C O2-concentration change) and the valued features of the
climate impact sector (e.g., changes in potential yields in
agriculture or ecosystems change measured as
replacement of current biomes with another one). T h e s e
response functions intend to support the decisions about
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limiting climate change impacts. For example, one can
conduct a T WA analysis to derive a long-term corridor of
C O2 emissions that would preserve at least 2/3r d of the
natural vegetation in non-agricultural areas without major
change such that the costs would not exceed 2% of
consumption any time over the entire time horizon. T h e
benefits in this specific case would be derived by
deducting the chosen maximum transformation
(underlying the primary emission corridor) from the
baseline transformation associated with the underlying
scenario without mitigation intervention.
5. National/regional levels
For many small countries, especially those with
emissions reduction commitments in Annex B,
mitigation and impacts/adaptation remain two separate
domains. On the one hand, governments and private
stakeholders are interested in how to comply with the
agreed short-term emission commitments. This requires
a cost-effectiveness analysis on the mitigation side to
generate least-cost implementation, including
transaction costs. The required framework is a detailed
CEA, for example, a technology-rich computed general
equilibrium model. The burden will be born by the fossil
e n e rgy sector, other energy-intensive sectors of the
economy, and the intermediate and final consumers of
their products. On the other hand, public and private
actors need to adapt to emerging and prepare themselves
for foreseeable impacts of climate change. T h e
applicable framework for private actors/sectors is CBA
to measure the marginal costs of adaptation against the
marginal benefits of averted damages. This is the case in
all market sectors, like agriculture and forestry. The
relevant decision framework for public organizations
responsible for providing public goods is CEA based on
some safe minimum standard. In both cases costs are
carried by the affected sectors and communities. There is
little chance for compensation from those whose
mitigation costs might be lower now to those whose
adaptation costs will increase in the future.
For a given country, the benefit of mitigation is basically
equal to the residual net damage. It can be calculated by
taking the baseline (unmitigated) climate change damage
and deducting the damage averted by mitigation (at
globally shared costs), the damages averted by
adaptation (at local costs), adding the costs of adaptation
and also considering the ancillary effects mitigation
(partly from global spillover, partly as a result of national
mitigation actions) and adaptation (predominantly from
local adjustments). It follows that the total costs of
climate change for a particular country is the sum of this
net damage and the mitigation costs. The country’s own
mitigation hardly affects the gross damage (because it
depends on the aggregated global effort), but it may
a ffect the net damage if the resources devoted to
mitigation reduce the amount of resources available for
adaptation. Nonetheless, there is hardly any balancing
between the national mitigation and adaptation
expenditures. 
6. Summary and conclusions
This short paper addresses the possibilities of calculating
the benefits of GHG mitigation in different decision
analytical frameworks. In general, mitigation benefits
are defined as the difference of impacts (whether or not
measured and aggregated in monetary terms) between
the baseline damages (in the absence of climate policy)
and those accruing under some level of GHG mitigation.
Global CBAs provide both the efficient level of climate
change (stabilization level) and its cost-eff e c t i v e
realization (stabilization path) in an internally consistent
manner. Yet they raise many problems and therefore the
implementation of their results might be infeasible and
would likely be undesirable anyway.
Global CEAs focus on the least-cost achievement of
environmental targets, in the climate case CO2- or GHG-
concentrations or maximum levels of climate change.
CEA models do not have damage functions and are
therefore ignorant of the benefits. Other sources are
needed to determine the benefits associated with
different concentration or climate stabilization limits.
One could use the damage modules of CBA models or
stand-alone damage functions. The SLA/TWA
frameworks focus on avoided damage at affordable cost.
Their damage representation is fragmented and
incomplete. This makes benefit estimates from such
frameworks difficult and the results will be partial. All
these global studies are useful for providing ballpark
estimates of risks, hedging costs, and benefits but the
real action takes place at the national level. 
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Calculating the costs of and designing policies for
climate change happen in two almost fully separated
domains in most countries. On the mitigation side, public
regulators, increasingly involving affected private actors,
seek cost-minimizing strategies for compliance with
international mitigation commitments in the near term.
On the impact side, a different group of public agencies
and private stakeholders prepare for and start
implementing national and local adaptation strategies
over the medium and long term. These two domains are
separated by the economic arenas they belong to, their
ownership, and decades of time when their respective
outlays are due. Trade-offs in such cases is not very
meaningful to contemplate because compensations
between the two domains are highly questionable.
There are many models and studies exploring the global
stabilization costs and proposing cost-eff e c t i v e
implementation strategies. A first comprehensive review
is presented in IPCC (2001). In contrast, little attention
has been devoted to quantifying benefits at the globally
aggregated level. Moreover, there is hardly any sign of
studies reporting bottom-up estimates of mitigation
benefits. This is a major missing piece of information for
various reasons. First, such information could contribute
to verifying and recalibrating the global damage
functions and thus improve the global benefits estimates.
Second, this information could shed light on the
national-level benefits of different mitigation-
stabilization scenarios and indirectly inform mitigation
decisions.
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Outline of the Projections Chapter in
AR4 WGI: with Reference to the
Emissions Scenarios 
S.C.B. Raper
Alfred Wegener Institute, Bremerhaven, Germany
1. Introduction
The projections chapter for AR4 WG1 will draw on
model results from two model inter- c o m p a r i s o n
exercises relevant to the AR4. These model inter-
comparisons will form a major part of the projections
c h a p t e r. The first inter-comparison is for coupled
atmosphere-ocean general circulation models
(AOGCMs) and the second is for models of intermediate
complexity (EMICs).
The scenario runs requested for these inter-comparisons
are summarised in Box 1 and 2. Many of the scenarios
are not directly relevant to policymakers but are rather
idealized scenarios for an inter-model study of processes.
The more realistic multi-gas scenarios are represented by
three SRES scenarios: A1B, A2 and B1. 
There will be some challenges to the interpretation of
these model results. The calculation of forcing for the
d i fferent species differs between the models.
Consequently differences between model results result
from differences in forcing as well as differences in
climate model formulation (a metric for the latter being
the climate sensitivity). In addition, gas-cycle feedbacks
are not generally included in the inter-comparison runs
(the exception being the EMIC runs 6a-d), though there
is growing evidence for a temperature feedback on the
carbon cycle. 
Towards meeting these challenges to the presentation of
results for policymakers and to compliment this work,
these runs will also be performed with a tuned simple
climate model (SCM). This SCM will be used to extend
the scope by assessing the climate response to additional
scenarios. It is anticipated that these scenarios will
include the full set of SRES scenarios comparable to
what was done for the TAR. Other pertinent post-SRES
emissions scenarios may also be run with the SCM,
allowing the representation in WG1 of the more recent
work on emissions scenarios. Longer-term (several
centuries) stabilization scenarios will also be represented
using both the SCM and an EMIC model, the latter
having an important supporting role on this longer time
scale . It is hoped to obtain advice and open channels of
communication during this session as to which emission
scenarios should be used in addition to the SRES
scenarios. 
The TAR WG1 projections with a SCM presented a
range of warming over the 21st Century for all the SRES
scenarios. The construction of the TAR WG1 Figure 9.14
was pragmatic. It used a simple model tuned to
AOGCMs that had a climate sensitivity within the long-
standing range of 1.5 - 4.5 o C advocated by the IPCC.
Models with climate sensitivity outside that range were
discussed in the text and allowed the statement that the
presented range was not the extreme range indicated by
AOGCMs. The figure was based on a single
anthropogenic-forcing estimate for 1750 to 2000, which
is well within the range of values recommended by TAR
WG1 Ch 6, and is also consistent with that deduced from
model simulations and the observed temperature record
(TAR WG1 Ch 12.). To be consistent with TAR WG1 Ch
3, climate feedbacks on the carbon cycle were included.
The resulting range of global mean temperature change
from 1990 to 2100 given by the full set of SRES
scenarios is 1.4 to 5.8 oC. The uncertainty due to the
emissions scenarios is comparable to that due to climate
model uncertainties.
For the AR4, radiative forcing, carbon cycle feedback
and climate sensitivity, together with their uncertainties,
will be based on assessments across the AR4. Where
possible a probabilistic approach will be used.
Probabilistic estimates of 1765 to 2000 forcing is
anticipated from the forcing chapter. Uncertainties in the
magnitude of the carbon-cycle feedback will be
included. Several assessments of the uncertainty in the
magnitude of the climate sensitivity may be brought
forward, resulting in more than one set of temperature
change projections. One of these will be based on the
climate sensitivities of the AOGCMs, others may be
based on published probability density functions of the
climate sensitivity. The challenge is to present the results
in the most informative way for policymakers.
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Box 1: AOGCM runs requested for PCMDI 
inter-comparison data set
1. 20th century simulation to year 2000, then fix
all concentrations at year 2000 values and run
to 2100 (CO2 ~ 360ppm)
2. 21st century simulation with SRES A1B to
2100, then fix all concentrations at year 2100
values to 2200 (CO2 ~ 720ppm)
3. 21st century simulation with SRES B1 to 2100,
then fix all concentrations at year 2100 values
to 2200 (CO2 ~ 550ppm)
4. 21st century simulation with SRES A2 to 2100
5. 1% CO2 run to year 80 where CO2 doubles at
year 70 with corresponding control run
6. 100 year (minimum) control run including
same time period as in 1 above
7. 2xCO2 equilibrium with atmosphere-slab ocean
8. Extend one A1B and B1 simulation to 2300
9. 1% CO2 run to quadrupling with an additional
150 years with CO2 fixed at 4xCO2
10. 1% CO2 run to doubling with an additional 150
years with CO2 fixed at 2xCO2
for further details please contact Jerry Meehl at
meehl@ucar.edu
Box 2: Summary of EMIC model runs for
inter-comparison
Integration time 0 to 3000 years
1a-c Idealized CO2 stabilization runs: 0.5, 1, 2%/yr
to 2xCO2 then constant.
2a-c Idealized CO2 stabilization runs: 0.5, 1, 2%/yr
to 4xCO2 then constant.
3a-c Idealized reduction scenarios of -1%/yr after
0.5, 1, 2%/yr to 4xCO2.
Integration time AD 1765 to 3000
4a-e Smooth CO2 stabilization profiles: SP450,
550, 650, 750, 1000ppm.
4f-g Stabilization profiles with delayed turning
point: DSP450, DSP550.
4h-i Stabilization profiles with overshoot: OSP350,
OSP450.
5a-c Stabilization profiles for comparison with
PCMDI results (all species) A1B, A2, B1 then
constant.
6a-d Emissions commitment for EMICs with
dynamic carbon cycle component: CO2 emissions
as SP450, SP550, SP750, SP1000 then set to 0ppm
after 2100
For further details please contact Thomas Stocker
at stocker@climate.unibe.ch
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Constructing Probabilistically-Based
Emissions Scenarios
Mort Webster1 and John Reilly2
1University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
2MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global
Change
1. Background
The problem of designing effective and appropriate
climate policy is one of reducing and managing the risks
of severe climate impacts in the future. T h e r e f o r e ,
scientific guidance should characterize the uncertainties
and risks for decision makers.
The objectives in designing scenarios for assessment are:
• To help frame the debate,
• Provide common assumptions,
• Reduce the number of cases to study
• Span a useful range of the uncertainty,
• Provide a detailed storyline to enhance
communication.
2. Probabilistic vs. Storyline Approaches
There is a debate within the climate science community
between whether to use probabilistically based scenario
designs or to use a storyline approach to scenario design.
The best example of the storyline approach is the IPCC
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
(Nakicenovic et al, 2000). The SRES developed a set of
six “marker” scenarios, each of which represents a
different complete picture of how the world might
develop socially, economically, and technologically over
the next century.
The advantages of the SRES approach include the
provision of small set of common scenarios that have
been used extensively in the climate research community,
and that the intuition for the scenario assumptions is
enhanced by the storyline. One critique of the SRES,
h o w e v e r, is that no statement as to the relative likelihood
was attached to the scenarios (Reilly et al., 2001). Rather,
all scenarios were defined as equally plausible.
The probabilistic approach is grounded in the practice of
using probability distributions to formally characterize
and communicate the uncertainty in a particular outcome
variable (e.g., global mean temperature change in a given
decade). The advantages of this approach are that it
o rganizes our current knowledge about possible
outcomes and their relative likelihood, and that it allows
for the explicit exploration of risk-reducing strategies
through policy (Webster 2003). Critiques of this
approach include that communication is limited by the
less intuitive nature of probability distributions, the
difficulty in linking the results from one set of possible
assumptions across multiple outputs, the reliance on
expert judgment for socio-economic future trends, and
the false sense of accuracy that may be accorded to
numerical probabilities.
The perspective of the authors is that these two
approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. We
propose, and show an example below, that storyline
scenarios can be constructed based on probabilistic
uncertainty analysis, after which the discrete scenarios
can be communicated and used as common assumptions. 
3. Simple Example of a Probabilistic
Scenario Design
This presentation builds upon the uncertainty analysis in
Webster et al (2002), and uses it to design small sets of
emissions scenarios as an illustration of the proposed
approach.
The steps for this procedure are:
1. Conduct sensitivity analysis of parameters,
2. Construct probability distributions for key
parameters,
3. Perform uncertainty propagation (Monte Carlo),
4. Use distributions of outcomes (emissions) to identify
interesting targets,
5. Find an appropriate set of parameters that give the
target emissions, and
6. Choose a small set of scenarios: combinations of
parameter assumptions and their resulting outcomes.
Steps 1-3 are described in detail in Webster et al (2002).
The model used for this exercise is the MIT Emissions
Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Babiker
et al., 2001).
The results of an uncertainty analysis, probability
distributions of projected outputs of interest, can be used
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to locate percentile values to define scenarios, as shown
in Figure 1a. For each targeted outcome value, such as
global CO2 emissions in 2100, there are many possible
combinations of the uncertain input assumptions that
would yield that result within some small error. The task
then is to choose one such representative assumption.
One obvious choice is to choose the set of input
parameter values that are the most likely, in the sense of
having the highest joint density. In the case of EPPA, the
input parameters are the labor productivity growth rate
and the autonomous energy efficiency improvement rate.
The emissions from the chosen parameter sets are shown
in Figure 1b.
We define a set of 15 emissions scenarios using the
above procedure as follows: seven scenarios that results
in global CO2 emissions at 1%, 10%, 33%, 50%, 66%,
90%, and 99%, and additional four scenarios that result
in other greenhouse gases at 10%, 33%, 66%, and 90%
conditional on CO2 at its median, and four additional
scenarios that result in urban pollutant emissions (SO2,
NOX, etc) at their 10%, 33%, 66%, and 90% conditional
on CO2 emissions at their median.
4. Integrated Approach to Emission
Scenario Design
Using percentiles from distributions of emissions is a
simple way of using probabilistic bounds to guide
scenario design. However, because emissions scenarios
serve as common assumptions for climate and impacts
projections, the design can be improved by considering
the role that emissions play in climate modelling.
From a climatic perspective, emissions are primarily
interesting only in terms of their aggregate impact on
total radiative forcing in the climate system. Designing
scenarios that span the probability space across multiple
emissions will not necessarily result in a useful spread
across the probability distribution of radiative forcing.
A better approach would be to design scenarios to explore
percentiles of the radiative forcing distribution. Then one
can choose emissions scenarios that result in the desired
radiative forcing with other interesting properties. For
example, we could choose to design scenarios at the 5%,
50%, and 95% values for radiative forcing. The scenario
set above is less well spread out (Figure 2a). A n
alternative set of ten scenarios (Figure 2b) contains three
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Figure 1: a) PDF of CO2 emissions is used to locate
i n t e resting fractiles for scenarios; b) set of emission
scenarios that result in desired fractiles; c) CH4 emissions
f rom scenarios that vary economic growth, energy
efficiency, and emissions factors.
that give 5% RF with different combinations of
emissions, four that give 50% RF and three that give
9 5 % .
5. Challenges
This simple illustration has several limitations, including
the fact that even better bases for design exist, such as
global mean temperature change or cumulative forcing.
Critics may still object to the use subjective probabilities
for some quantities. In the end, we still a means of
designing scenarios that are most useful and efficient for
scientific assessment to advise policy. Probabilistic
methods provide one aide in this design problem.
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Figure 2: a) Probability distribution of net radiative forcing
with scenario forcings shown; b) alternative set of emissions
scenarios based on radiative forcing.
How likely are the SRES scenarios?
Richard S.J. Tol
Hamburg, Vrije and Carnegie Mellon Universities
Probabilistic scenarios cannot be avoided. If one is
mainly interested in quantitative results, this is obvious.
A number is meaningless without a confidence interval.
If one is mainly interested in qualitative results,
probabilistic analysis is not necessarily called for, or so
it seems. However, an insight is meaningless if it is not
robust. Alternative scenarios are needed to test
robustness. Alternative scenarios should span the range
of not implausible futures. That range can only be
derived from probabilistic scenarios. Besides the
question in its title, this paper investigates whether the
SRES scenarios span the range of not implausible
futures.
The SRES scenarios were severely criticised by Castles
and Henderson. That critique focussed on the use of
exchange rates. The choice of exchange rates, however,
does not matter much (relative to the other uncertainties)
for carbon dioxide concentrations and hence for climate
change. On the other hand, the choice of exchange rates
does matter for assumed development pathways, and
hence vulnerability to climate change, and for the
distribution of carbon dioxide emissions, and hence the
distribution of mitigation costs and responsibilities. The
choice of the discount rate matters so much, primarily
because of the convergence of per capita incomes and
emission intensities assumed in the SRES scenarios.
The SRES scenarios were build with model that were
originally designed for the analysis of energy policies.
Such models use scenarios, but here they were used to
build scenarios. Using and building scenarios are
different things. Also, for building emissions scenarios,
more knowledge is required than knowledge of energy
systems. Furthermore, the models used were calibrated
to data sets with a relatively short time span. Because of
funding constraints, validating the models against longer
time series was never a priority.
I collected long term data on population, per capita
income, energy use, and carbon dioxide emissions from
energy use. I plotted these data together with the four
alternative projections according to the IMAGE 2.2
model. I used the data to estimate the Kaya identity in
differential form. I extrapolated the model, and used the
forecast error to calculate the relative probabilities of the
four SRES scenarios. The following results emerge.
The population scenarios are largely in accordance with
history. It is peculiar that the A1 and B1 scenarios have
the same populations, even though their economies are
very different.
The per capita income scenarios for developed countries
are largely in accordance with history. For developing
countries, this is not the case. China’s economy, for
instance, has been stagnant if not declining for most of
the last five centuries. Only the last two decades saw
rapid economic growth in China. All four scenarios
continue the pattern of most recent times. Rapid
economic growth is also foreseen, in all scenarios, for
other developing countries. For Africa, this is a clear
break with the past. The four scenarios foresee rapid
convergence of incomes across the world in the current
century, even though the past two centuries witnesses
income divergence.
The projections of energy intensities only partly conform
with history. The fastest decreases of energy intensities
in the scenarios are not faster than was observed in the
past. However, the scenario foresee decreases only, even
though energy intensities have increased as well in the
past. Energy intensities across the world converge in all
scenarios, not faster than the maximum observed rate,
but always faster than the minimum observed rate.
The projections of emission intensities for individual
regions span the range of observed past behaviour. All
scenarios foresee further convergence of emission
intensities first – in line with past observations – but
d i v e rgence later. The scenarios all show the same
qualitative pattern of convergence, and diverge only
minimally quantitatively.
The above pattern suggests that the SRES modellers
know a lot about the supply side of the energy system,
but less about the demand for energy. Their knowledge
of economic development is lacking. Their demographic
expertise is sound, but strangely separated. My personal
knowledge of the SRES modellers confirms this
assessment.
The relative probabilities of the four alternative SRES
scenarios confirms this picture. The scenarios for the
period 2000-2050 for populations each have
probabilities of over 10%; for emission intensities, the
A2 and B1 scenario are most likely, but the other two
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scenario have more than a 0.1% chance For the scenarios
for per capita incomes and energy intensities, the
situation is different. Here, the A2 scenario is by far the
most likely, and the other three scenarios are extremely
unlikely.
For the period 2050-2100, a similar picture emerges,
albeit less extreme. The Kaya trend projection method
used here is, however, less suitable for projecting this far
into the future.
If one applies the same trend projection method directly
on emissions, the relative probabilities SRES scenarios
are all acceptable (that is, not lower than 10% chance)
for the period 2000-2050. This suggests that the errors in
the underlying scenarios largely cancel each other out.
The following conclusions can be drawn. The SRES
scenarios are not equally likely. The A2 is by far the most
realistic. The SRES scenarios do not span the range of
plausible futures. The range of emissions can be
somewhat wider, and the range of underlying
development can be much wider. The SRES scenarios do
not accord with past trends. On the one hand, this makes
for interesting scenarios. On the other hand, it is odd that
all SRES scenarios break with past trends at the same
time, and that this trend break is sometimes at the point
where data end and scenarios start.
The SRES scenarios are therefore useful as emissions
scenarios. When used in climate models, they more or
less span the range of not implausible futures. The SRES
scenarios are less useful for climate change impact
analysis, at least for those studies in which impacts do
not only depend on climate change but also on
vulnerability and hence development. The SRES
scenarios are less useful for emission abatement studies,
at least for those studies that use regional models and are
interested in the distribution of mitigation costs and
responsibilities.
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1. Introduction
This paper reports some preliminary results of the
Innovation Modelling Comparison Project (IMCP). The
IMCP is an international collaboration with the objective
of improving the understanding of the insights from
differences in model formulations and their results on the
one hand, and to identify robust results across models on
the other hand. The IMCP focuses on mechanisms of
endogenous technological change and its impact in the
context of climate policy. Technological change is
widely recognised as key to tackling climate change; less
well understood are the mechanisms by which such
change occurs, and the diverse and varied ways this can
be included in economy-energy-environment models.
2. Aim of the project
The IMCP aims to look at the impact of endogenous
technological change on the economics of stabilising
carbon dioxide emissions at different levels. With its
special focus on endogenous technological change it is
complementary to model comparisons of the Stanford
Energy Modelling Forum (EMF). This paper compares
and analyses results from a broad range of economic
models paying especial attention to the following
questions: First, what are the impacts of the different
mitigation options on macroeconomic costs under
different stabilisation scenarios in different regions?
Second, how and why do time-paths of emissions
constrained by climate policies differ between different
formulations of technological change? Third, what are
sign and extent of international spillover effects arising
from technology diffusion? 
3. The Role of Technological change: 
a brief modeling survey
Environmental and climate policy interventions create
constraints and incentives that affect the process of
technological change. Imposition of climate control
instruments can stimulate invention and innovation
processes. The invention and innovation practices are
carried out primarily in private firms through increased
research and development (R&D). Te c h n o l o g i c a l
innovations can become widely available by
technological diffusion processes. The induced
innovation hypothesis recognizes R&D investments as
profit-motivated investments stimulated by relative price
changes. Climate policy measures that increase the price
of fossil fuels augment the market for low carbon
technologies. This effect creates incentives for increased
R&D expenditures in the sectors affected by climate
change. Increased R&D expenditures accelerate
technological change that lowers the costs of low carbon
technologies. These effects reduce compliance costs and
can lead to increased profits (Porter and van der Linde
1995). However, investment in R&D could also "crowd
out" other investments (Gray and Shadbegian 1998).
Which could reduce the profits of firms. Econometric
tests confirm these ambiguous results. Jaffe and Palmer
(1997) find that a carbon tax reduces aggregate R&D
causing a decline of knowledge accumulation and a
decrease in the rate of technological progress, which
results in a deterioration of income and output. Other
analyses conclude that environmental policies can have a
strong positive feedback on innovation and may induce
beneficial economic outcomes (Popp, 2001 and 2002). 
In economy-energy-environment models, the
representation of technological changes is an important
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source of uncertainty in determining the economic costs
of climate policy strategies (see Jaffe et al. 1995 and
Jaffe 2000). Many of the models applied to climate
change analysis have treated technological changes as
"exogenous", i.e. technological changes are defined as
assumptions fed into the model, rather than emerging as
part of the economic response to scarcities within the
model.
Economy-climate models that incorporate technological
change endogenously in this sense determine
technological innovations either by investment in R&D
as “induced technological progress”, integration of
spillovers from R&D, or by including technological
learning processes, particularly scale-economies and
“learning by doing” phenomena. Numerous modelling
approaches investigate the economic effects of
technological change. On a micro, or bottom-up, scale
different kinds of technologies are assessed in detail. On
a macro, or top-down, scale aggregated economic
feedback effects of technological progress are evaluated.
In top-down models, technological progress is mostly
represented as an innovation which produces the same
amount of output (GDP) with smaller amounts of input
factors. This implies an increase in input factor
productivity. In contrast to an exogenous representation,
induced technological progress endogenously triggers
increased productivities by different sources such as
investment-induced technical progress or R&D-induced
technological progress. Modelling results confirm that
excluding endogenously determined technological
responses leads to an overestimation of compliance costs
(Loeschel 2002, Kemfert 2005). 
As initial installations of technological innovations are
very often expensive, costs decline over time with
increasing experience. One representation of
endogenous responses in technology-rich models is
through ‘experience curves’. These describe cost
reductions as a function of accumulated experience in
production. Many applied modelling concepts, including
bottom-up modelling concepts with a detailed
representation of energy technologies, apply learning
curves as a meaningful description of technological
changes (Grübler et al. 1999, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan
2003, or Azar and Dowlatabadi 1999). Dowlatabadi
(1998) finds that emission abatement costs decline
substantially if technological change is induced by
technological progress, and when learning-by-doing is
considered. Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2003) find that
the learning by doing effects that make cheaper non-
carbon technologies available induce positive economic
impacts and reduce the costs of climate policies.
Some models that incorporate induced technological
change by investment in R&D, but also increased
opportunity costs, do not find large impacts on
abatement costs (Goulder and Schneider 1999, Nordhaus
2002, and Buonanno et al. 2003). Buonanno et al. (2003)
introduce technological change into the RICE model.
The model comprises one R&D sector, whose
accumulated stock has two effects: it increases total
factor productivity and decreases the carbon intensity of
the economy. In contrast to Nordhaus’ R&DICE, R&D
investments not only reduce carbon intensity but also
create an external effect increasing the total productivity
of the whole economy. Therefore, economic growth and
emissions can only be decoupled if the parameters are
chosen in a way where the reduction in carbon intensity
overcompensates the growth-enhancing effect of R&D
investments. Popp (2004) shows that induced
technological change significantly raises the benefits of
a specific climate policy strategy, but does not largely
reduce the costs. He finds that a backstop technology has
a greater potential to reduce the costs of climate
protection than the improvement of energy efficiency
because the R&D investments needed in the latter case
crowd out the R&D investments in other sectors.
Therefore, the net impact of induced technological
change on the macro-economic mitigation costs is not
substantial. However, these results are derived using an
exogenous time path for total factor productivity. Many
models that include learning-by-doing find large welfare
gains from induced technological change (Chakravorty
et al. 1997, Goulder and Mathai 2002, Manne and
Richels 2005, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan 2003). This
result is confirmed by many bottom-up energy system
models – learning-by-doing within the renewable energy
sector reduces the costs of meeting specific
concentration targets (Manne and Barreto 2004, Kypreos
and Barreto 2000). Edenhofer et. al. (2005) have derived
the opportunity costs of R&D investments in an
endogenous growth framework incorporating different
energy sectors and a sector for resource extraction. It
turns out that the contributions of different mitigation
options to achieving climate protection goals differ very
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much. Moreover, induced technological change reduces
the macro-economic mitigation costs substantially.
4. Method of model comparison
The models participating in this comparative study have
in common that they incorporate technological change in
innovative ways, and that they allow an assessment of
macro-economic costs of global carbon dioxide
mitigation. At the same time, these models cover a wide
range of model types. We differentiate four models types
that we characterise in the following way:
1. Econometric models determine economic
interlinkages based on different economic theoretical
concepts. They are based on time series data. This
class is represented by the Cambridge Econometrics’
E3MG model, of which the main features are
Keynesian disequilibrium macroeconomic economic
structure estimated in time series data using Engle-
Granger cointegration, and input-output structure for
each region. E3MG differentiates 20 world regions,
41 industrial sectors, 28 consumption categories, 11
fuels, and 17 fuel users. 
2. Endogenous Economic Growth Integrated
Assessment Models. Economic growth is a driving
force of GHG emissions. Endogenous growth theory
views long-term dynamics of technological change
as an outcome of endogenous investment decisions.
Early Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) in this
framework were highly aggregated models without
technological detail. Recently, Endogenous Growth
IAM have begun to incorporate technological
dynamics by disaggregating selected sectors. 
3. Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE)
divide the economy into distinct, interdependent
sectors. Households and firms within these sectors
independently try to optimise their welfare and their
profits, respectively. Within CGE models an
equilibrium is calculated at each point in time, which
guarantees not only that all markets are cleared but
also that a Pareto-optimum is achieved. Sectoral
resolution and the dynamics of relative prices are the
main strengths of CGE models.
4. Energy System Models derive a cost-minimal
sequence of energy technologies for an exogenously
given energy demand using linear programming. In
more advanced versions the energy technologies are
improved by learning-by-doing. The main advantage
of this approach is that technological change is based
on an engineering assessment of diff e r e n t
technologies.
The project also outlines features of technological
change which are not captured by the participating
modelling teams so far. A first step in this direction is the
following classification of endogenous technological
change: Table 1 comprises a list of modelling teams,
modelling types and features of technological change. 
1. L e a r n i n g - b y - d o i n g generally means that an activity
improves its own eff i c i e n c y. The underlying
assumption is the existence of learning curves, i.e.
rising efficiencies or declining costs are a function of
accumulated experience. Often, investment costs are
modelled to be decreasing with cumulative
investments, or efficiency parameters are modelled to
increase with cumulative activity. Learning-by-doing
can work within and between sectors but also across
national boundaries. International spillovers induced
by learning-by-doing are just starting to be seen as a
potentially positive feedback. For example, renewable
e n e rgy technologies may have large global benefits if
their learning-by-doing potential is transmitted in
developing countries by foreign direct investments.
2. Learning-by-searching describes a specific activity
leading to innovations. In contrast to learning-by-
doing it is assumed that such an effort is required for
technological progress, or that innovation can be
sought independent of other activities. Learning-by-
searching may be implemented as research and
development (R&D) investments which in the end
increase an efficiency parameter or decrease
investment costs. Learning-by-searching is often
incorporated in models via so-called double factor
learning curves improving efficiency parameters of a
specific technology or sector. They can also diffuse
across national and regional boundaries.
3. R&D investments: There are also R&D investments
at a macro-economic level where the overall
efficiency parameters in the production function are
determined by R&D investments. In general this
R&D investments have the potential to improve
labour, energy and capital productivity.
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4. Path dependent investments: Technological change
is path-dependent if initial conditions determine the
choice of long-term technological trajectories. The
change to more efficient technological trajectories
would induce prohibitive costs. Such a “lock-in” can
be overcome if “lock-out options” are available
which reduce the costs of transition through path-
dependent processes.
5. Externalities from capital accumulation:
Investment externalities describe capital-embodied
technological change, i.e. by purchasing new
equipment the inherent technological progress
becomes available, leading to an increased
p r o d u c t i v i t y. This is often modelled by letting
investments cause improvements of eff i c i e n c y
parameters in the production function.
6. Vintages of capital stock: Technological progress
makes increasingly better equipment available for
investments at later dates. This motivates
differentiating the age-structure of capital stocks,
where different vintages of capital stock differ in
efficiency parameters. 
Modelling teams have been asked to calibrate their
models to a given baseline; for this purpose, the Common
POLES/IMAGE (CPI) baseline was selected. It was
agreed to run CO2 concentration scenarios at stabilisation
levels of 450, 500, and 550 ppm CO2. Current debate
about climate policy targets often includes the target of a
maximum 2°C increase of the global mean temperature
relative to the pre-industrial level. The European Union,
for example, has adopted the 2°C target. We would like to
stress that meeting this restriction is a greater challenge
than 450 ppm CO2 stabilisation: Simulations under a 2°C
warming constraint show maximum concentrations
below 450 ppm CO2. Running simulations that keep a
2°C constraint requires the integration of a climate
module that translates GHG concentrations to global
mean temperature. The technical effort therefore goes
well beyond the task of running CO2 s t a b i l i s a t i o n
scenarios. A l t e r n a t i v e l y, stricter CO2 c o n c e n t r a t i o n
scenarios than 450 ppm could be used to estimate the
e ffect of a 2°C target on the economy. Extensions of this
model comparison exercise that heed this issue are under
p r e p a r a t i o n .
In order to assess the impact that the presence of
endogenous technological change has on model output,
these scenarios were run with and without endogenous
technological change enabled. From the multitude of
model output of the different models, we asked
modellers to report the following key values: gross world
product, carbon dioxide emissions and concentrations,
marginal costs of emissions and of fossil energy, energy
consumption, and investments related to technological
change. Where possible, we asked to distinguish
different energy sources, world regions, and to report
other GHG.
Preliminary results from those models able to meet the
first deadline include the following findings. 
Previous model comparison exercises have shown that
CGE models tend to calculate higher mitigation costs
than energy system models or economic growth models
(Loeschel 2002); we find that this result still holds when
technological change is endogenised. Also, the presence
of endogenous technological change seems to have only
little impact on macro-economic mitigation costs in
some models, whereas in other models it has a
substantial impact. In this research project we try to
identify the crucial economic mechanisms driving the
different impacts of technological change on mitigation
costs, investment dynamics, and other crucial macro-
economic variables.
It is desirable to identify the contributions that different
carbon mitigation options have in achieving an overall
mitigation target, and to assess the role of technological
change in a mitigation effort. Kaya’s identity provides a
set of indicators that pinpoint the different ways taken by
models to meet a given target, namely the decomposition
of carbon dioxide emissions into GWP, its energ y
intensity, and carbon intensity of the energy (Figure 1).
While in some models mainly energy consumption and
G W P are reduced in order to achieve emission
reductions (even in the case of endogenous technological
change), we find that in other models the reduction of
carbon-intensity is predominant. Here, reduction of
carbon-intensity is mainly triggered by the introduction
of backstop technologies, and the transformation of the
fuel mix in general. 
This analysis can be taken to a more detailed level by
extending the decomposition analysis to features of
technological change. To do so, identities similar to
Kaya’s identity have to be derived, e.g. decomposing
carbon intensity reduction in effects of increasing the
share renewable energy, capturing and sequestering CO2,
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and switching from coal to gas. In IMCP we try to
improve on comparing highly aggregated variables like
G D P losses because at high levels of aggregation
structural changes are not resolved which are crucial in
assessing the impact of technological options and in
designing efficient climate policies. 
5. Scientific challenges of IMCP
1. Improving model comparability: It is well-known
that the chosen baseline effects mitigation costs,
shadow prices, and investment trajectories in a major
way. The IMCP seekes to harmonize baselines and
scenarios among the models. Furthermore, a
reasonable set of indicators has to be developed
which captures the impact of endogenous
technological change on crucial parameters.
2. Harmonizing concentration targets: There are
different ways to restrict carbon dioxide emissions in
model simulations. The IMCP runs concentration
stabilisation scenarios, which may need to be phrased
as CO2 only, CO2 equivalent, or cumulative CO2
emission targets depending on the model.
Additionally, due to differences in the carbon cycle
mode, the same concentration target may appear
more restrictive in some models than others.
However, the straightforward solution of using the
same carbon cycle model may not be feasible
because of implementational issues.
3. Incorporating furt h e r aspects of Endogenous
Technological Change: As is evident from Table 1,
few models incorporate any endogenous
technological change features beyond learning-by-
doing. The IMCP aims to debate which type of
technological change to incorporate in order to match
empirical stylised facts of economic growth, such as
vintages, externalities induced by physical and
human capital accumulation. 
4. Calibration and empirical validation of the
m o d e l s : Applied models are based on stylized
assumptions about key parameters such as discount
rate or Armington and substitution elasticities.
Especially the incorporation of endogenous
technological change takes into account only few
empirical assessments of concrete case studies. We
aim at estimating the elasticities and key factors that
drive endogenous technological changes in diverse
countries of the world.
There is consensus that mitigation costs depend critically
on the assumptions about technological change. The
I M C P intends to analyse the influence of crucial
parameters of technological change on important
variables such as investments, emissions etc. in a
quantitative way. Based on this modelling comparison
exercise, empirical studies could be conducted in order
to validate models. This effort is worth to be undertaken
because most these models are heavily used as support
systems for decision makers.
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Figure 1: Contributions to cumulative CO2 reduction 2000-
2100. This Figure shows the cumulative amount of CO2
mitigated in the period from 2000 until 2100 in the 450 ppm
C O2 concentration scenario with technological change,
relative to the baseline. A decomposition analysis on the
basis of Kaya's identity was used to attribute CO2
reduction to the effects of reductions in carbon intensity,
energy intensity, and gross world product.
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Table 1: This table lists the modelling groups participating in IMCP, and the features of technological change implemented
in these models.
Learning- R&D Path Externalities
Learning- by- invest- dependent from capital Vintage
Model Group Type by-doing searching ments investments accumulation capital
E3MG Cambridge Econometric Y N Y Y N N
GET-LF-E Chalmers ESM N Y N N N N
worldscan CPB CGE/IAM N N N N N N
WIAGEM DIW CGE/IAM N N Y N N N
AMIGA EPA ESM/IAM Y N Y Y Y Y
FEEM-RICE FEEM Growth-IAM Y Y Y N N N
MESSAGE IIASA ESM Y N N N N N
PAGE Hope IAM N N N N N N
MERGE-ETL PSI Perfect foresight IAM Y Y N N N N
GEM-E3 MERIT CGE N N N N N N
PACE ZEW CGE N N N N N N
AIM NIES CGE/IAM Y N N N N N
DNE21+ RITE ESM Y N N N N Y
IMACLIM-R CIRED Growth Y N Y N N N
MIND PIK Growth Y N Y N N Y
IMAGE RIVM CGE/IAM Y N Y N N N
DEMETER-1CCS IVM Growth-IAM Y N N Y Y Y
DEMETER-2E IVM Partial-equ.-IAM Y Y Y Y Y N
ENTICE Popp Growth-IAM Y Y Y N N N
FUND UHH IAM with 
Solow growth model Y N N N N N
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Modeling Endogenous Technological
Change 
A reflection for emission scenario builders
Sjak Smulders
Tilburg University
1. Introduction
New ways of modeling endogenous technological
change have been developed in endogenous growth
theory. Insights from this literature can be used to
incorporate endogenous technological change in
economic climate change models. Moreover, merging
growth models and climate change models, we might
strengthen the model link between climate policy and
development. We argue that the endogenous growth
insights differ markedly from the environmental
economics insights on technological change.
2. Partial abatement models versus
endogenous growth
In the textbook case, technological change in the context
of environmental issues is modeled as an shift in the
marginal abatement cost curve. Technological change
reduces the cost of reductions in emissions (cf. Goulder
and Mathai 2000). This insight from partial equilibrium
model does not generally carry over to general
equilibrium models with endogenous technological
change. 
At the other extreme, (endogenous) technological
change plays a key role in growth theory. In general
equilibrium growth models, technological changes
drives long-run per capita growth. When introducing
environmental issues in standard endogenous models
(Romer, 1990), a reduction in pollution generally crowds
out investment in productivity improvements. As a
result, the cost of reducing emissions is larger when
technological change is endogenous than when
technological change is independent of investments and
profit incentives (Smulders 1998). 
The contrast between the two results stems from the
completely different nature of technological change in
the partial abatement models and the endogenous growth
models. In the former, technological change reduces the
cost of “restauration activities” that do not aff e c t
production decisions. Moreover, what is called
technological change should better be labeled diffusion,
since the supply of new technologies is not modeled. In
endogenous growth models, technological change
reduces the cost of production by increasing the
productivity of production factors, including polluting
input factors like energy. Thus, technological change
increases, rather than decreases, the cost of reducing
polluting inputs. 
The two results are extreme. We generalize the general
equilibirum models with endogenous technological
change to find how robust the finding is that endogenous
technlogical change increases the cost of emissions
reduction policies.
3. The degree of endogeneity of
technological change
Conventional models assume completely exogenous
technological change. Some recent models have
introduced the notion of induced technological change:
price changes might change the path of technology.
Endogenous growth models assume all technological
change stems from profit maximizing innovating firms. 
As a generalization, we considers a model in which
technological change stems from both exogenous
sources as endogenous investments. Changing the
relative weight of endogenous technological change in
total technological change, we find that the larger this
weight, the more emission reduction policies should be
undertaken early on to minimize the cost of climate
change. Thus, frontloading of abatement becomes more
important when endogenous technology plays a larger
role (Smulders, 1998). In the partial equilibrium model
the opposite result – optimal backloading of abatement –
is found (Goulder and Mathai, 1998). 
4. Modeling issues
To endogenize technological change, in market
economy models, learning by doing (LbD) or
Research and Development (R&D) can be
modeled. R&D modeling requires:
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• imperfect competition. Firms must have the incentive
to increase profits through innovation
• knowledge spillovers. Innovators generally cannot
capture the full returns to R&D because of the non-
rivalness of knowledge that is generated by R&D. 
• taking into account multiple externalities and
distortions (at least with respect to the environmnet
and to innovation). 
LbD is mostly modeled through learning curves: a larger
scale of (cumulative) activity speeds up cost reductions
(technological change). Often it is argued that LbD is
simpler to model (e.g. Galeotti, 2004). For example, by
linking cost reductions to sector-wide activity levels,
individual firms do not need to make monopoly profits
and the sector can be modeled as being fully competitive.
However, when thinking about optimal or cost-reducing
emission reduction, an investment cost is still involved:
cost reductions can only be realized by increasing the
scale of one sector at the cost of learning in other sectors. 
Technological change may occur in various dimensions:
some innovations reduce thae cost of energy-intensive
technologies, other innovations induce energy saving.
Hence, the direction (or bias) of technological change
should be taken into account and should be endogenized.
Relevant dimensions of technological change are
abatement versus integrated technology; and diffusion
versus innovation. 
A new workhorse general equilibrium model for directed
technological change is the model by Acemoglu (2002).
He models directed technological by allowing
innovation to affect factor augmentation levels. In the
context of climate change models, innovators develop
new (intermediate) goods or production processes in
energy-intensive sectors or in energy-extensive sectors.
For example, the economy’s production function might
be given by Y = F (AM M, AE E), where F(.)is a CES
production function, M and E are man-made and energy
inputs, respectively and AM and AE are factor
augmentation evels, which are endogeously determined
by innovation efforts. 
Leaving out one or more of the possible directions of
technological change (by treating one of the factor
augmentation levels as exogenous) biases the results. For
example, if in the example above AE is endogenous and
AM is exogeous, a cut in emissions E might increase the
rate of return to innovation (if substitution is poor – with
good substitution the rate falls). However, if AE is
exogenous and AM is endogeous, a cut in emissions E
always decreases the rate of return to innovation. This
example also shows that the interaction between
innovation and substitution is an important modeling
issue. 
5. Directed technological change
A policy of emissions reduction changes the relative
incentives to innovate in the sectors and shifts the
direction of technological change. Depending on
externalities, there is now a possibility that the return to
innovation goes up such that innovation is crowded in
(Smulders and De Nooij, 2003, cf. Goulder and
Schneider 1999). Nevertheless, the overall cost of
emissions reduction is larger with directed technological
change than with exogenous technological change.
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Technology is the broad set of processes covering know-
how, experience and equipment, used by humans to
produce services and transform resources.2
Technological change is a central issue in addressing
climate change. The character of technology employed
by humans affects both the emissions of greenhouse
gases and the cost of limiting those emissions. The state
of technology makes an enormous difference to the cost
of achieving any environmental goal. The more stringent
the environmental goal, the greater is the value of
technology in meeting that goal.
As a consequence, the determinants of change in
technology have generated renewed interest.
Unfortunately, the present state of knowledge is such that
there is no simple answer to the question, what are the
mechanisms by which technology changes? This interest
has generated a recent literature that has explored the
relationship between alternative mechanisms by which
technology might change and factors such as the
emissions pathway, policy portfolio, and the cost of
meeting an environmental goal. That literature has
produced a variety of results, not all of which are
consistent.3
Technology in use is highly heterogeneous. T h i s
heterogeneity reflects a variety of factors ranging from
the history of technology deployment and the vintage of
devices in existence to imperfections in institutions and
information transfer to variation in factor endowments
from place to place. At any point in time there is a
significant difference between technology that is
deployed and the best technologies that could be
constructed and deployed based on existing knowledge
(the "technological frontier"). This distinction is real, but
frequently blurred in models. The focus of this paper is
on the forces shaping the technology frontier and largely
ignores the issue of technology deployment and
diffusion and its associated voluminous literature.4
There is a wide array of factors that have been identified
as influencing the technology frontier including research
and development (R&D), learning, and spillovers5. R&D
includes both basic scientific research and applied
research. Basic scientific research is the foundation on
which applications are built6. In contrast applied
research refers to those activities through which basic
knowledge is transformed into technology options. R&D
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2 See J. Edmonds and J. Moreira.  2003.
3 For example Grubb (1997) concluded, “… policies that act to constrain CO2 emissions will tend to create incentives in energy markets to turn
the bulk of corporate energy R&D away from improving fossil fuel technologies towards developing and deploying lower carbon technologies.”
in contrast, Nordhaus (2002) concluded, “…that we should not look to regulatory stringency or high emissions taxes as a way of forcing inventors
to solve our global environmental problems. Popp (2002) concludes that, “…the effect of induced innovation on [optimal] emissions and mean
global temperature is small.”  Goulder and Mathai (1999) concluded that, “When knowledge is gained through R&D investments, the presence of
ITC justifies shifting some abatement from the present to the future. However, when knowledge is accumulated via learning-by-doing the impact
on the timing of abatement is analytically ambiguous.”  And Smulders (1997) writes “…the introduction of endogenous technological change has
nontrivial implications for optimal environmental policy. The numerical calculation in this paper show that the impact of endogenous technological
change on short-run pollution reduction policies may be large. If half of technological change is endogenously generated, first-period pollution
reduction should be 16 to 19 percent higher than when technological progress is completely exogenous.”
4 See for example, Metz et al. (2000) for an assessment of this literature.
5 It is worth noting that we do not consider economies of scale as a source of technological change, but rather a characteristic of either the
technology or the market.  These characteristics can have an important influence on technology deployment.  For example, in the automobile
manufacturing sector scale matters.  As a consequence, small manufacturing production runs are associated with high unit costs, while large
production runs are associated with lower costs.
6 Stokes (1997) makes the distinction between two types of basic scientific research:  curiosity driven basic science research (“Bohr’s Quadrant”)
and basic research motivated by potential use (“Pasteur’s Quadrant”).
is funded by both the government and the private sectors
and is conducted by industry, government, universities,
not-for-profit companies, and research consortia.
A great deal of attention has been paid to learning-by-
doing (or using) in recent studies. But, that literature has
not always been careful in distinguishing between
learning-by-doing, which refers to the observation that
the more an individual or organization repeats a task, the
more adept or efficient it becomes at that task, and
experience curves, which refers to the statistical
relationship between cost and cumulative production.7
There is a well established literature that documents the
causal relationship between task repetition and
efficiency of production. Experience curves, on the other
hand, are a reflection of all effects by all factors that
shape both cost and technology deployment.
The effect of activities undertaken in another domain on
technology is referred to as a spillover. Many examples
exist. The development of advanced turbine designs in
the aerospace industry made the high efficiency natural
gas combined cycle turbine possible. Developments in
sensors and computational capabilities made a
marketable hybrid gasoline-electric vehicle possible. The
development of advanced computational capabilities
combined with the development of magnetic resonance
imagery led to the development of 3D seismic imagery,
which combined with directional drilling, greatly
expanded oil and gas reserves. It is important to note that
spillover effects make technology advance possible, but
generally require alterations to deploy in the receiving
sector. Spillovers are international8, interindustry and/or
intraindustry in origin. The literature on spillovers also
distinguishes between spillovers in knowledge, and
"rent" spillovers, that is, spillovers strictly of economic
benefits that occur indirectly through market forces.
Both the public and private sectors participate in the
process of technology development. In general we treat
private sector actions as growing out of the competitive
process and framed by markets and tempered by
institutions and market conditions. We treat government
activates as affecting market conditions and institutions.
Government policy can affect R&D directly through
support for basic research and through applied research.9
A central issue is the relative contributions of various
forces to shaping technological change. This issue has
two facets, historical and prospective. The historical
component of the problem is determining the relative
contributions of various factors for any historical change
in technology. The prospective component of the
problem is establishing the relative contributions of
various factors for future technologies. Both are
complicated by the question of extra sectoral effects.
That is, what effect did an improvement in technology
have on technology in other sectors? This is particularly
pertinent when one contemplates a technology policy
that would increase the rate of technological change in a
specific sector. One must also ask to what degree that
policy altered the rate of technological change in other
sectors. Government policy can affect the rate of
technological change through various pathways
including direct government sponsored R&D including
support for basic and/or applied research, and indirectly
through policies that affect institutions and markets, such
as patent law, taxes, regulations, or technology
deployment activities.
There is a substantial literature on the sources of
technological change including literatures on productivity
and R&D1 0, statistical experience curves11, general
purpose technologies1 2, technology opportunity1 3,
environmental regulation and environmental technology
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7 The relationship between cumulative production and declining costs has been variously termed the learning curve, progress function, and
experience curve, depending on the level of analysis and how it is interpreted (Dutton and Thomas 1984).  Here we use the term “experience curve”
to limit confusion with learning-by-doing.
8 The distinction between international transfer of technology and international spillovers is somewhat vague.
9 Examples include the development of technologies for the measurement, monitoring and verification of phenomena as well as support for
technology development. 
10 See for example, Griliches (1992), Nadiri (1993), Australian Industry Commission (1995).
11 See for example, Christianssion (1995), McDonald & Schrattenholzer (2001).
12 See for example, Bresnahan & Trajtenberg (1992), Helpman (1998).
13 See for example, Klevorick, et al. (1995).
a d v a n c e1 4, and “demand-pull” versus “technology
p u s h ”1 5. While this literature has not produced a simple
mechanism to forecast technological change, it has
produced many insights. It is clear, for example, that
induced environmental innovation is a reality. But,
technology also advances as a function of sources larg e l y
unresponsive to environmental policies. This literature is
unable to determine whether own-industry or extra-
industry sources of technological change are more
important, or whether learning is any more or less
important than R&D. However, the literature does show
that there are strong interactions between different modes
of technological advance. For example, spillovers and
R&D interact strongly. Many instances exist in which
technological advance outside the industry required
additional R&D to enable its adoption.
One of the most important findings is that the “optimal”
or “right” technology policy is unlikely to be a simple
prescription. For example, there is little evidence that
technology “Push” policies, which directly influence
technological advance (e.g., publicly funded R&D), or
technology “Pull” policies, which alter private incentives
and ability to innovate (e.g., environmental regulation,
patent laws, anti-trust regulation), are either dominant
strategies.16 Furthermore, the literature suggests that
spillovers are strong and that the maintenance of a strong
technological base for society is important to any
technology strategy. Thus, a strong educational system,
support for basic sciences, including both fundamental
scientific research motivated by curiosity and
fundamental scientific research motivated by potential
use, and the institutions to encourage technology
development such as patent law, are potentially central
elements in a technology strategy to address climate
change.17
While research indicates that the processes of
technological advance are varied and complex, energy-
economy model representations of technological
advance tend to be simple and mechanistic. Ironically the
simplicity in model representation is an outgrowth of the
complexity and uncertainty surrounding real world
processes.
The role of technology in any given model will be
shaped by the character of the model. Several
implications flow naturally from this point. First, and
most obvious, technologies that are not included in the
model cannot play a role. A wide array of technologies,
such as for example, hydrogen, carbon dioxide capture
and storage, combined heat and power, and
b i o t e c h n o l o g y, has been identified as potentially
contributing to the future global energy system,
particularly in the presence of policies to stabilize
greenhouse gas concentrations. Yet many models do not
consider these technologies explicitly. While this is most
apparent where advanced energy technologies are
concerned, it is also the case in other more familiar
domains such as energy end-use technologies. Many
models represent the use of energy in buildings, industry
and transport without specific reference to technology.
Yet, changes in energy intensity in scenarios account for
a larger change in potential energy use than expanded
energy supply. Thus, an obvious source of potential
insight lies in an enhanced representation of technology
in energy end-use to supplement representations of
energy supply technologies. Even many energy supply
technologies are represented crudely and analytical
insights could be gained by their improved
characterization.
Models are also not always careful in distinguishing
between best available technology and technology in
use. This is a common problem when the vintage of plant
and equipment is not explicitly recognized. Physical
capital stocks embody a specific technology regime and
its character places limits on technological change. The
degree of flexibility available at the time of investment
in new plant and equipment is significantly greater than
afterward.18 Furthermore, because the capital cost of a
technology is a sunk cost, existing plant and equipment
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14 See for example, Jaffe & Palmer (1996), Lanjouw & Mody (1996), Brunnermeier & Cohen (2003), Newell, Jaffe, & Stavins (1998).
15 See for example, Mowery & Rosenberg (1979), Rosenberg (1982), Mowery & Rosenberg (1989), Utterback (1996), Rycroft & Kash (1999).
16 See, for example, Norberg-Bohm (2000) and Norberg-Bohm (2002).
17 See, for example, Nelson (1993)
18 The ability to retrofit existing plant and equipment increases technology flexibility somewhat.
can continue to operate long after the point in time when
similar units cease to be chosen for deployment as new
plant and equipment. Thus, the availability of older
vintages of plant and equipment places limits on the
penetration of new vintages of technology.
Many models of energy and greenhouse gas emissions
place the mechanisms of energy technological change
outside the model. That is, the advance of energ y
technologies is determined exogenously. In such models,
technologies change either at a prescribed exogenous
rate or as discrete changes over time. More recently
studies have begun to consider the induced response of
technological advance to government policies. Some
studies have substituted experience curves for an
exogenously specified description of technology and
technological change over time.19 Experience curves
model the cost of supply as a simple function of
cumulative deployment. This model is based on
observations of a statistical relationship between
production cost and cumulative deployment, as for
example in Figure 1. As noted earlier, this relationship is
frequently confused with learning-by-doing, which is the
relationship between repetition of a task and efficiency.
Experience curves are a statistical relationship and as
such reflect all factors that affect cost and all factors that
affect deployment. It is conventional to attribute the
entire decline in the cost of production to cumulative
deployment. Soderholm and Sundqvist (2003) warn that
this can lead to attribution problems. For example,
Figure 2 shows experience curves derived from a model
run using the MiniCAM modeling framework, described
in Edmonds et al. (2004), which exhibit a negative
correlation between the log of technology cost and log of
cumulative production consistent with the experience
curve formulation, even though cost was determined by
an exogenous rate of technological change.
Researchers have begun to develop more sophisticated
representations of technology change in energ y -
economy models such as for example, two-factor
experience curves, which incorporate direct R&D
investment along with technology deployment.20 While
two-factor experience curves reflect a realization that
there is more to technological change than merely
cumulative deployment, they ignore key features such as
spillovers. Manne and Richels (2002) explored the
implications of an induced technological change model
with both experience curves and spillover effects and
show that including spillover effects can have important
implications for key analytical results.
Even these efforts have only begun to scratch the surface
of endogenous technological change. A sense of the
richness of the phenomenon can be gleaned by
examining the influence diagram developed by Clarke
and Weyant (2002) to describe the many forces shaping
technological change, Figure 3.21 No modeling system
presently in use comes close to incorporating the full
richness of induced technological change described in
Figure 3. They remain simple compared with the
phenomenon they attempt to describe.
Modeling results have shown themselves to be highly
contingent on both the form of the simple model
employed and the parametric values employed to enliven
them. It is therefore not surprising that the literature
derived from simple models of endogenous
technological change should generate diverse and
sometimes conflicting results. Any simple deterministic
model of technological change employed in the context
of general energy-economy interactions will likely lead
to incomplete or erroneous implications at some point.
The challenge then is to move the state-of-the-art toward
a more complete and sophisticated representation
technology and technological change in analytical
models.
IPCC Expert meeting on emission scenarios, 12-14 January 2005, Washington DC
ANNEX II: EXTENDED ABSTRACTS OF PRESENTATIONS
66
19 This literature is reviewed by Clarke et al. (2004) and McDonald, A. and L. Schrattenholzer (2001). 
20 This is sometimes referred to as “two-factor learning curves”, but is more accurately described as “two-factor experience curves.”  See for
example Barreto (2001), Bahn and Kypreos (2003) and Soderholm and Sundqvist (2003).
21 The reader interested in understanding the details of this figure is directed to Clarke and Weyant (2002).  Its purpose here is simply to convey
the richness and complexity of the phenomenon of endogenous technological change.
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Figure 1: Experience Curves for Various Technologies
Source: Grübler, et al. (1999), p.254.
F i g u re 2: Experience Curves for T h ree Te c h n o l o g i e s
Derived From a MiniCAM Scenario
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Figure 3: A More Complete Framework for Interpreting and Analyzing Technological Change.
Source: Clarke and Weyant (2002), p.26.
Multigas scenarios to stabilise
radiative forcing
Detlef van Vuuren, Francisco DelaChesnaye, 
John Weyant
1. Introduction
Most literature on mitigation scenarios has concentrated
on CO2. Clearly, CO2 is the most important greenhouse
gas in terms of its contribution to increased radiative
forcing. However, taken together the non-CO2 gases
contribute to about 25% current greenhouse gas
emissions. One reason for the limited number of so-
called ‘multigas studies’ is that consistent information on
reduction potential for the non-CO2 gases has been
lacking. Available studies exploring the impacts of
including non-CO2 gases nevertheless find that major
cost reductions can be obtained through the relatively
cheap abatement options for some of the non-CO2 gases
and (more generally) the increase in flexibility (e.g.
(Hayhoe et al. 1999; Reilly et al. 1999; Tol 1999; Blok et
al. 2001; Jensen and Thelle 2001; Manne and Richels
2001; Lucas et al. 2002; Van Vuuren et al. 2003)) or
indicate important advantages in terms of avoiding
climate impacts (Hansen et al. 2000). 
For ‘CO2-only’ stabilization, a large range of studies,
using different approaches, allows for a reasonably good
understanding of mitigation potential and the associated
range of costs across a wide range of climate targets (as
a function of a wide range of assumptions and modelling
approaches) (see Hourcade and Shukla (2001)). A similar
situation has not existed for multi-gas stabilisation, as the
number of individual studies were rather low,
methodologies have not been compared and studies have
hardly assessed multiple stabilisation targets. T h e
context of a large modelling comparison study (EMF-21)
and the data that has been collected in this context on
marginal abatement costs for non-CO2 (Kyoto) gases has
provided an opportunity for change. 
2. Methodological questions in multigas
analysis
The multi-model study performed by EMF-21 was
focussed on developing insights into the question about
how multigas strategies on climate change differ from
‘CO2-only’ mitigation strategies. Three methodological
questions directly arise: 1) how to define the stabilisation
target for a multi-gas stabilisation scenario; 2) how to
allow for substitution among the different greenhouse
gases; and 3) how to incorporate abatement of non-CO2
gases into the modelling framework. Regarding the first
question, in the EMF-21 study it was decided on the
basis of analogy with CO2-only (where studies focussed
on stabilisation of the CO2 concentration) to study the
stabilisation of radiative forcing. More specifically, a
comparison was made of model studies that focussed on
stabilising radiative forcing at 4.5 W/m2 based on a
multi-gas versus a CO2-only strategy.22 The second and
third question were left to individual modellers groups to
decide upon. In this paper, we discuss the results of the
EMF-21 modelling groups – and finally relate the results
to the more methodological questions raised above.
3. Development of emissions without
climate policies
All modeling groups provided a reference scenario on
development of emissions of the major greenhouse
gasses in the absence of climate policy. The results
(Figure 1) show that in all cases, CO2 emissions are
projected to increase but the spread in model results is
considerable, from 12 to 35 GtC. On average (across all
models), CO2 emissions increase by 1.4% per year
during the 21st century. A considerable part of the spread
in fact originates in the second part of the century where
some models show sustained emission growth – while
others show emission growth to slow down or even
reverse (mostly by stabilising or declining global
population). For most models, the projected emissions
increase in CH4 is considerably less than that of CO2 for
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22 In addition, some models run a third scenario aiming to reduce the rate of temperature change.
most models. Averaged across the different models, the
annual emission increase amounts to 0.6%, leading to a
decline of the CH4 share in total emissions from 18% to
13%. The main reason for the slower growth of CH4 than
those for CO2 is that emissions mostly originate from the
agriculture sector. Activities in this sector are expected to
grow less fast than the main driver of CO2 emissions,
energy consumption. Emissions of N2O are projected to
grow at 0.2% annually in the 21st century. Also here, the
share to total emissions drops from 9 to 4%. Even more
as for CH4, N2O emissions originate from activities with
clear saturation tendencies. Note that for N2O, base year
emissions of the different models differ substantially.
Two factors may contribute to this. First of all, different
definitions exist of what should be regarded as human-
induced and natural emissions in the case of N2O
emissions from soils. Secondly, some models may not
have included all emission sources. In conclusions,
without climate policies the baseline scenarios explored
project emissions of non-CO2 gasses to grow – but their
contribution to overall emissions to drop.
Figure 1 also compares the EMF-21 results with the
IPCC SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000). In
general, the range of the EMF-21 coincides well with
those from SRES, certainly in the case of the non-CO2
gasses.23
The total emissions growth under these baseline
scenarios implies a strong increase in radiative forcing.
Reported radiative forcing by the model groups increases
from more-or-less 1.7 W/m2 above pre-industrial now to
6-8 W / m2 in 2100. This implies that none of the
reference scenarios complies with the 4.5 W / m2
stabilisation target without additional policies in place.
4. Stabilising radiative forcing at 4.5
W/m2: Multi-gas versus CO2-only 
In order to reach the selected emission profile that leads
to stabilisation of the greenhouse gas radiative forcing at
4.5 W/m2, greenhouse gas emissions (measured in terms
of CO2-equivalents) in the different models need to be
reduced by something in the order of 70% in 2100 in
comparison to the baseline emissions (these numbers
obviously differ strongly depending on the baseline.
In the CO2-only strategy, by definition the larg e s t
contribution in mitigation comes from reducing CO2
emissions. CO2 emissions are reduced by about 75% in
2100 compared to baseline Nevertheless, as shown in
Figure 2 a small part of the emission reductions are, in
fact, achieved through reduction of CH4 and N2O, as the
systemic changes in the energy system, induced by
putting a price on carbon, also reduces these emissions..
In the Multi-gas scenario, less stringent reductions of CO2
are obviously required. Nevertheless, still a considerable
reduction of CO2 is required given the large share of CO2
in total emissions (on average, 60% in 2100) It should be
noted that the reduction rates are not distributed evenly
across the different gases and the contributions of diff e r e n t
gasses change sharply over time. 
The reduction for CH4 in time differs notecably among
the models. The choice of using GWPs as a basis for
substitution among different gasses (as for instance
defined in the Kyoto Protocol) plays a major role in this.
For those models that base substitution on GWPs, the
reduction of CH4 emissions in the first three decades is
already substantial. In contrast, models that do not use
GWPs only start to reduce CH4 substantially by the end
of the period. The logic in the latter case is that aiming
specifically at the long-term target set in the analyis,
early CH4 reduction does not pay-off given its short life-
time. In the first group of models, however, CH4
emissions are attractive based the available low cost
reduction options. Other uncertainties that may
contribute to the existing range among different models
include the total reduction burden (as a function of
baseline emissions), the distribution among different
sources, the different methodologies in handling
technology development..
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23 The most important difference is noted for CO2:  in the short term 2 SRES scenarios are above the EMF-21 range and in the longer run the B1
is clearly below the SRES range. The latter is caused by the deliberate assumption of radical energy efficiency improvement in B1.
For N2O, the increased reduction in the multi-gas
strategy is not that large as for CH4. The main reason is
that the identified potential for emission reduction for the
main sources of N2O emissions, fertiliser use and animal
manure, is still limited. For N2O, the use of GWPs does
not play an important role – given its medium lifetime,
which is similar to that of CO2.
What does this mean for costs? Two concepts of costs
have been looked at, the marginal costs of emission
reduction and the reduction of GDP growth. Figure 3
shows the value of the required carbon tax in each of the
models in the multi-gas case compared to the CO2-only
case. While there are clear differences among the models
and in time, on average, the reduction in the marginal
costs amounts to 30-60%. Almost all models show a
much stronger reduction in the first decades, in which a
considerable part of more expensive emission reductions
now being replaced by cheaper reductions in non-CO2
emissions. In the second part of the century, the
reduction is reduced to about 30%. Some models,
however, show again by the end of the scenario period an
increasing cost benefit from the multi-gas strategy as it
avoids the steep costs increases involved in deep CO2
emission reductions. For the second cost indicator, GDP
losses, more-or-less the same results can be seen. The
cost reduction here is about 30-40%, with again the
largest benefits occurring in the first decades of the
scenario period.
5. Conclusions and way forward
EMF-21 performed a multi-model comparison project on
scenarios that not only encompass CO2, but also other
major greenhouse gasses. The analysis showed the
following results:
• Under baseline conditions, the share of non-CO2
gasses is expected to be reduced from 25% to 17%
(on average).
• A multigas strategy can achieve the same climate
goal at considerably lower costs than a CO2-only
strategy. The cost reduction may amount to about 30-
50%. 
• Under a multi-gas strategy using the 100-year GWPs,
the contribution of the non-CO2 gases in total
reductions is very large early in the scenario period
(50-60% in the first two decades). Later in the
scenario period, the contribution of most gases
becomes more proportional to their share in baseline
emissions.
• Not using GWPs (but instead determining
substitution on the basis of cost-effectiveness in
realising the long-term target within the model)
implies that reductions in CH4 are delayed to later in
the century.
• Identified reduction potentials for non-CO2 gasses
get exhausted if substantial emission reductions are
required. Further research into identifying means to
reduce agriculture CH4 and N2O emissions and
expected technological change is therefore an
important research topic.
• Research has focussed on stabilising radiative forcing.
H o w e v e r, some publications have indicated that
stabilisation of the global temperature can be achieved
more cost-effectively by profiles that result in radiative
forcing levels that peak and then decline. Further
research could focus on such overshoot scenarios.
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Figure 1: Baseline emission development in the EMF-21 scenarios (left) and comparison to the SRES scenarios (right)
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Figure 2: Reduction of emissions in the stabilisation strategies, CO2-only versus multigas
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Figure 3: Costs of stabilising radiative forcing at 4.5 W/m2, ratio of costs in the multigas case over the CO2-only case.
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Multi-Gas mitigation analysis for
Global and China
Kejun Jiang, Xiulian Hu, Zhu Songli
Energy Research Institute
By recognizing the importance of non-CO2 g a s e s
mitigation for climate change abatement, modeling study
for multi-gas scenarios was conducted by using IPAC
model. This paper presents the study for China and
global analysis. The China study is based on the
emission scenario study for China and global analysis is
part of EMF-21 study for comparing the cost for CO2
mitigation and multi-gas mitigation. The main objective
of this analysis is to evaluate the potential and costs of
non-CO2 greenhouse gas abatement in China and in the
world. 
For quantifying these gases from various sources, IPA C -
emission model was used. Integrated Policy A s s e s s m e n t
model for China (IPAC) was a model framework
developed in Energy Research Institute, to analyze energ y
and emission mitigation policies with focus on China. 
The study follows the process of EMF 21. Therefore
scenarios defined in EMF 21 were used here. There are
several scenarios defined by EMF 21. Because of IPAC-
Emission model has the capacity to analyze long-term
scenarios, three scenarios were picked up from EMF-21
study, that are modeler’s reference scenario, and two
Long-term climate change, Cost-minimizing Scenarios
including CO2 mitigation only scenario and multi-gas
mitigation scenario.
For the CO2 mitigation only scenario, compared with
reference scenario, there will be 55.8% GHG emission
reduction by 2100 (see figure 5). GDP loss could be
2.4% by 2100 (see figure 15). Carbon tax need generally
increase from US$50/t-C in 2000 to US$350/t-C by 2100
to get larger emission reduction (see figure 5). Because
of only reduce CO2 emission in this scenario, by 2100
the share of CO2 in total GHGs will reduced from 73%
in 2000 to 60% in 2100 (see figure 7). CO2 mitigation
will have strong impact on energy activities, much more
renewable energy have to be utilized after 2050 (see
figure 8), this give strong requirement for technology
R&D from now.
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In multi-gas mitigation scenario, compared with CO2
mitigation scenario, carbon tax could be lower, started
from US$25/t-Ce in 2000 to US$210/t-Ce by 2100 (see
figure 25). GDP loss would be 1.8% in 2100, 23% less
GDP loss compared with CO2 mitigation scenario (see
figure 15). CO2 emission shares 71.6% in 2100 in total
GHG emissions while it is 60% in CO2 mitigation only
scenario. There are large potential for non-CO2 emission
reduction, especially before 2020. By 2020 there could
be nearly 30% emission reduction for non-CO2 gases,
and it would be 35% emission reduction in 2100. Total
primary energy demand could have less pressure to
reduce CO2 emission, it could be 8% more energy used
in 2100. 
If comparing multi-gas mitigation scenario and reference
scenario, by 2100, CO2 takes largest share for the
reduction, it accounts for 87% of total GHG reduction;
CH4 accounts for 11%, and 1.2%, 0.3%, 0.02% and 0.1%
for N2O, HFC, PFC and SF6. If comparing CO2
mitigation and multi-gas mitigation scenario, CH4, N2O,
Figure 1: GHG emission of reference scenario
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Figure 2: GHG Emission of CO2 mitigation scenario
HFC, PFC and SF6 contribute 83%, 10.7%, 3.3%, 0.2%
and 2.2% respectively to non-CO2 gases emission
reduction.
Because of large population and catch up with developed
countries, developing countries accounts for 75% of total
GHG emission in the scenario. In CO2 m i t i g a t i o n
scenario, compared with reference scenario, China and
south, south east Asia take largest part of the reduction,
together they account for 45% emission reduction. 
By comparing the results for different scenarios, it is
found that there is quite large potential for non-CO2
mitigation potential. Multi-gas mitigation policies could
have lower cost compared with CO2 only mitigation
policies. In order to reach same mitigation target level of
GHG emission, there could be 30% lower carbon tax rate
for multi-gas mitigation, and therefore GDP loss could
be reduced by 23% in 2100. Multi-gas mitigation could
give less pressure for energy system to transform.
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Figure 4: Global GDP loss
Figure 3: GHG emission of multi-gas mitigation scenario
Stabilization Metric
Richard Richels
EPRI
rrichels@epri.com
Initial studies on the costs of stabilization focused on
atmospheric CO2 concentrations primarily from the
combustion of fossil fuels.24 More recently, the analyses
have been expanded to include non-CO2 greenhouse
gases and terrestrial sequestration. The addition of other
trace gases has highlighted problems associated with
Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) and has led to the
exploration of alternative approaches for making
tradeoffs among gases. Most recently, the discussion has
been expanded to include what constitutes an appropriate
stabilization metric (e.g., concentrations, radiative
forcing, temperature change, or impacts). In this note,
each of these issues is discussed in turn.
Studies of the costs of stabilizing CO2 c o n c e n t r a t i o n s
suggest that mitigation costs are sensitive to a variety of
socioeconomic, scientific, technological, and geopolitical
factors. Key determinants include: 
1. Future emissions in the absence of policy
intervention; 
2. The behavior of the natural carbon cycle;
3. The cost differential between carbon venting
technologies and carbon free alternatives;
4. Technological progress and the rate of adoption of
technologies which emit less carbon per unit of
energy produced; 
5. Transitional costs associated with capital stock
turnover which increase if carried out prematurely; 
6. The concentration target and route to stabilization;
7. The degree of international cooperation; 
The extent to which market mechanisms are employed
both internationally and domestically.
C o s t - e ffectiveness studies suggest that the costs of
stabilizing CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere
increase as the stabilization level declines. Whereas there
appears to be a moderate increase in costs when passing
from a 750 to a 550ppmv stabilization level, there is a
larger increase when passing from 550 to 450ppmv. The
nonlinearity in the abatement cost curve appears to be
due to increasing pressure to prematurely retire existing
plant and equipment as the ceiling approaches 450ppmv.
Different assumptions about the key determinants of
costs (as summarized above) can have a strong influence
on absolute costs.
Until the TAR, climate policy analyses had focused
almost exclusively on CO2 emissions abatement. This is
not surprising, given the importance of CO2 relative to
other greenhouse gases, and both the capabilities of
existing models and the paucity of data related to the
non-CO2 greenhouse gases at that time. Nevertheless, it
was recognized that a CO2 emissions only approach can
lead to significant biases in the estimation of compliance
costs.
Since the TAR, there have been a number of efforts to
incorporate multiple greenhouse gases into stabilization
analyses. Most notable is the current study organized by
the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF 21)2 5,
which involved 18 modeling teams from around the
world, including participants from Asia, A u s t r a l i a ,
Europe, and the US. In addition, extensive data gathering
efforts were conducted by the USEPA and the IEA
Greenhouse Gas R&D Program. The modelers worked
closely with those responsible for data gathering to
identify data requirements and to ensure that the analyses
were based on the best available information. 
For its long-term stabilization target, the EMF 21 study
chose radiative forcing rather than atmospheric
concentrations for a ceiling. Using the latter is
problematic since it requires an arbitrary way to make
trade-offs among gases. By choosing a ceiling to which
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24 For purposes of the current discussion, the term “cost” applies exclusively to abatement or mitigation costs. It does not include the damages
associated with global climate change.
25 Contact John P. Weyant: weyant@stanford.edu
each gas contributes (i.e., radiative forcing), the trade-
offs among gases can be based on the relative prices of
each gas as determined by its contribution to the ceiling.
This approach, which includes both physical and
economic considerations, avoids the methodological
problems associated with the use of GWPs.
The results of the EMF 21 study showed that total
abatement costs were reduced (in some cases
substantially) when multiple greenhouse gases were
included in the abatement strategy. Although the focus
was on limiting radiative forcing, the models also
showed the concentration levels associated with each gas
in order to meet a particular target. Differences in results
among models were due not only to diff e r e n t
assumptions regarding those factors influencing CO2
emissions abatement costs, but also diff e r e n t
assumptions regarding the costs of non-CO2 greenhouse
gas abatement. The results of this effort will be published
in a special edition of the Energy Journal in early 2005.
More recently, there has been an effort to extend the
analysis further along the causal chain connecting human
activities and impacts. Given the current uncertainties in
our understanding of the climate system, it is impossible
to project with any degree of confidence the effect of a
given concentration ceiling on temperature. Or
conversely, for a particular temperature cap, the required
concentration ceiling is highly uncertain. This calls into
question the current focus on atmospheric
concentrations.
From a benefit-cost perspective, it would be desirable to
minimize the sum of mitigation costs and damages.
Unfortunately, our ability to quantify and value impacts
is limited. For the time being, we must rely on a
surrogate. Some argue that focusing on temperature
rather than on concentrations provides much more
information on what constitutes an ample margin of
safety. Concentrations mask too many uncertainties that
are crucial for policy making. This issue is likely to be a
major focus of the new EMF 22 study, which will
consider alternative long-term climate stabilization
scenarios and is scheduled to begin this fall.
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